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Abstract
We study a Bayesian Persuasion game with multiple senders employing condi-
tionally independent experiments. Senders have zero-sum preferences over what
information is revealed. We characterize when a set of states cannot be pooled in
any equilibrium, and in particular, when the state is (fully) revealed in every equi-
librium. The state must be fully revealed in every equilibrium if and only if sender
utility functions are sufficiently nonlinear. In the binary-state case, the state is fully
revealed in every equilibrium if and only if some sender has nontrivial preferences.
Our takeaway is that ‘most’ zero-sum sender preferences result in full revelation.
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1 Introduction
A key question in the economics of persuasion is the effect of competition on information
provision. While it has been shown that information disclosure increases with competition
in some settings (Battaglini (2002); Milgrom and Roberts (1986); Shin (1998)), in others
competition has the opposite effect (Emons and Fluet (2019); Kartik et al. (2017)). In
this paper we address the question by modelling two or more senders persuading one (or
multiple) receiver(s) about an unknown state. The senders influence the receiver’s beliefs
by disclosing information in the manner of Bayesian Persuasion. Unlike existing work,
our senders simultaneously choose conditionally independent experiments; the receiver
observes these experiments and their realizations and updates her belief. To fix ideas,
consider competing lobbyists commissioning reports to persuade a politician (or entire
legislature) to vote yes/no on a climate change bill. Here the state may be whether climate
change is a threat; the politician would only like the bill to pass if it is while lobbyists
have differing interests in it passing. Our analysis applies equally well to prosecutor and
defense attorneys persuading a judge or media outlets persuading voters.
We consider an environment where senders are maximally-competitive —the senders’
payoffs are zero-sum functions of the receiver’s posterior. This assumption is natural
for the lobbyist example as lobbyists may only care about the probability the bill is
successfully passed, which varies with the politician’s posterior. Our question is: how
does competition affect how much information is revealed in equilibrium and how does
this change with the number of senders?
There is always an equilibrium of this game in which all senders fully reveal the state.
Our main result is that typically the state is fully revealed in every equilibrium. We find
that —under mild technical assumptions —when sender utility functions are sufficiently
nonlinear (in particular are nonlinear on every edge of the simplex) then regardless of the
number of senders the state is fully revealed in every equilibrium.1 If utility functions
are sufficiently linear, there are equilibria in which the receiver does not always learn the
state. Two implications are worth mentioning. In the binary-state case, the state is fully
revealed in every equilibrium if and only if some sender has nontrivial preferences. If the
receiver chooses among a finite set of actions, then generically the receiver learns enough
to take her first best action; furthermore, the state is fully revealed in every equilibrium
if and only if the receiver prefers a different action in every state.
1The every quanitifier implies, by standard arguments, that if the conditions for full revelation are
met for zero-sum utilities, then for utilities close to those all equilibria are almost fully revealing.
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The intuition for our results can be seen from the two-sender binary-state case. The
first observation is that, as a sender is always free to fully reveal the state and the game
is zero-sum, each sender must do exactly as well in any equilibrium as she would from
full revelation. When utility functions are nonlinear, we show that some sender i can
guarantee a payoff strictly larger than from full revelation whenever her opponent j does
not fully reveal the state. Sender i can do this by choosing an experiment that ensures
the posterior will fall in regions she has an ‘advantage’ and not in regions her opponent
has an advantage.
This idea extends to arbitrary finite state spaces and more than two senders. Given
choices of experiments for each sender, we say that a set of states is not pooled if the
receiver never assigns positive probability to all of them. We show that a subset of states
is not pooled in every equilibrium if and only if conditional on the receiver learning the
state is in this subset, some sender has strict preferences over what further information
to reveal. For instance, a pair of states is not pooled in all equilibria if any only if some
sender’s utility is nonlinear on the edge of the simplex between those two states.2 It
follows that nonlinearity on every edge is necessary and sufficient for full revelation in
every equilibrium.
Related Literature. This paper relates most closely to work in the multiple
sender Bayesian Persuasion literature, most notably Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) and
Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) (henceforth GK). These authors’ main finding is that
more competition leads to no less equilibrium information. GK (2017), like us, find that
in zero-sum games sufficient nonlinearity in sender preferences ensures full revelation in
every equilibrium. However, both GK papers make a strong and arguably unrealistic
assumption that senders can choose from a set of ‘Blackwell connected’ experiments that
allow for arbitrary correlation in senders’ experiments’. In contrast we study the case of
conditionally independent experiments; conditional independence is a common assump-
tion in information economics. We discuss the distinction in Section 5 and show that, but
for a few additional assumptions we make, our results generalize that of GK (2017).
Boleslavsky and Cotton (2018) and Au and Kawai (2020) study two senders per-
suading a receiver. However their setups are substantially different from ours because
each sender can only reveal information about part of the state (their own type); as a
consequence, they find unique non-fully revealing equilibria. Li and Norman (2018a), Li
and Norman (2018b), and Wu (2017) consider Bayesian Persuasion with multiple senders
moving sequentially. Finally, in a concurrent paper, Dworczak and Pavan (2020) (hence-
2i.e. the line joining degenerate beliefs on the two states.
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forth DP) study a single persuader who is uncertain about what additional information
nature may give the receiver and chooses an experiment to maximize her worst-case pay-
off. This setting is related to competition between two senders in our model (our case
of more than two senders is less related). While their baseline model allows nature to
arbitrarily correlate her experiment with the persuader’s, they address the case of condi-
tionally independent experiments in a supplementary appendix and obtain results close
to ours. However, due to differences between the models, our results concerning the total
information revealed in equilibrium are stronger. See Section 5 for discussion.
2 Model
There is a state ω ∈ Ω = {1, ..., N}. All agents have a common prior belief on ω with full
support pi ∈ int∆(Ω). There are M > 1 senders, 1, ...,M , who persuade a receiver.3
Fix a set of signals S with |S| = |∆(Ω)|. The game starts with each sender i
simultaneously choosing a set Si ⊂ S, |Si| < ∞, and an experiment Πi : Ω → ∆(Si).
Each Πi gives the probability of the receiver receiving each signal in Si conditional on
each state. As |Si| <∞, senders may only choose finite signal experiments; we relax this
assumption in Supplementary Appendix B.4 Implicit in this definition of experiments is
that senders’ experiments are independent conditional on the state.
The receiver observes the choices of Π1, ...,ΠM (and implicitly S1, ..., SM). Then,
the state is realized (but not observed by the receiver) and signals from each of the M
experiments, s1 ∈ S1, ..., sM ∈ SM , are realized and observed by the receiver. The receiver
is Bayesian and updates his belief on ω to some posterior β ∈ ∆(Ω). Senders receive their
payoffs and the game ends.
Senders’ payoffs depend only on the receiver’s posterior belief β. Each sender i has a
piecewise analytic utility function ui : ∆(Ω)→ R.5 Crucially, we assume senders’ payoffs
are zero-sum: u1(β) + ... + uM(β) = 0 for all β ∈ ∆(Ω).6 For any state l = 1, ..., N let
δl ∈ ∆(Ω) represent the belief that puts probability 1 on state l. Due to the structure of
3As we do not explicity model the receiver acting, the model allows for any number of receivers.
4All equilibria with the finite signal restriction are equilibria without it.
5That is, each ui is defined by a finite partition of ∆(Ω) into convex sets and a real analytic function
for each element of the partition. Note this restriction is not necessary; see Section 5 for discussion.
6This could represent the reduced form of a game where the receiver chooses an action a ∈ A after
observing experiment realizations. The receiver has preferences ur(a, ω) and the senders may also have
state dependent preferences {ui(a, ω)}i which are zero-sum:
∑
i ui(a, ω) = 0 for all a ∈ A,ω ∈ Ω.
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the game, we can make the following normalization: ui(δl) = 0 for all senders i = 1, ...,M
and all states l = 1, ..., N .7
A strategy profile is a choice of experiment for each sender (Π1, ...,ΠM). Let Ui(Π1, ...,ΠM) =
EΠ1,...,ΠM [ui(β)] be sender i’s ex-ante expected utility from (Π1, ...,ΠM); the expectation
is over experiment realizations, of which β is a function. Senders choose experiments to
maximize their ex-ante expected utility.
Interim Beliefs. Instead of thinking of sender i picking Πi, it is easier to think of i
choosing a distribution over the receiver’s interim beliefs. For any i and choice of Πi, let
Γi ∈ ∆(Ω) be the random variable representing the receiver’s belief on ω if she observes
only the realization of Πi, si ∈ S. Γi represents the interim belief of the receiver after
she observes information from Πi but before viewing the realizations from {Πj}j 6=i and
updating to her posterior belief.8
Following Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), it is without loss for us to recast the
choice of experiment of each sender i as a selection of a Bayes-plausible distribution of
the interim beliefs, Γi, the experiment induces.
9 As we have restricted senders to picking
finite signal experiments, a pure strategy for sender i is a selection of a Bayes-plausible Γi
with finite support.10 Henceforth, when we use Γi it implicit that this random variable is
Bayes-plausible and has finite support. A strategy profile is a vector (Γ1, ...,ΓM). Fixing
any strategy profile and sender i, let Γ−i denote the experiment induced by observing
realizations {Γj}j 6=i.
There are two benchmark experiments to consider. We say Γi is fully revealing, or
Γi = Γ
FR, if Pr(Γi = δl) = pil ∀l ∈ Ω. If any sender chooses a fully revealing experiment the
receiver learns the state with certainty. The second benchmark is the fully uniformative
experiment which we will denote ΓU ; Γi = Γ
U if Pr(Γi = pi) = 1.
Equilibrium. A Nash Equilibrium of this game is a vector of random variables
(Γ1, ...,ΓM) such that no sender i can strictly improve her ex-ante expected utility, Ui(Γ1, ...,ΓM),
by deviating.
There is a trivial NE of this game: (ΓFR, ...,ΓFR). All senders are left indifferent
across all experiment choices as the state will be fully revealed by other senders’ ex-
7The normalization entails adding an affine function to each ui. Though it may change senders’
preferences over posterior beliefs, it will not change preferences over strategy profiles.
8As the receiver is Bayesian, the order in which she views signal realizations does not matter.
9A random variable Γ is Bayes-plausible if E[Γ] = pi.
10Note that any finite mixture of pure strategies is also a pure strategy.
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periments regardless. Our results characterize when the state is fully revealed in every
equilibrium.
3 Two Senders and a Binary State Space
First we derive the main results for the two-sender binary-state case. The intuition will
extend to the general case.
Figure 1: Example of u1 (blue) and u2 (red). u1(β) = β for β < 0.6 and u1(β) = 1 − β for
β ≥ 0.6. Sender 1’s preferences are those in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)’s leading example
with discontinuity at 0.6 and normalization u1(0) = u1(1) = 0.
Let Ω = {0, 1}. A belief here is a scalar representing the probability the state is
ω = 1. Figure 1 shows an example of sender preferences. A sender i’s strategy is a
choice of interim belief random variable Γi ∈ [0, 1]. Note that for any Γ1,Γ2 chosen, the
receiver’s posterior belief can be written as a function of the interim beliefs realized from
both experiments. If Γ1 = x and Γ2 = y, then the posterior is:
β(x, y) =
(1− pi)xy
xy − pix− piy + pi (1)
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Note that β(1, y) = β(x, 1) = 1 and β(0, y) = β(x, 0) = 0; if either interim belief
fully reveals the state, the other is irrelevant. Note β(0, 1) and β(1, 0) are not well defined
but this is not an issue as it is impossible for one sender to fully reveal ω = 0 while the
other reveals ω = 1.
For either sender i, given any strategy Γi, consider the distribution of Γi conditional
on Γj = x (j 6= i): Pr(Γi = y|Γj = x). Pr(Γi = y|Γj = x) can be constructed by taking
the signal structure Πi that corresponds to Γi and deriving the distribution over interim
beliefs it induces if x and not pi was the receiver’s prior.
Given an opponent choice of Γj, define Wi(x) as sender i’s expected payoff conditional
on generating Γi = x. For a fixed Γ2 W1(x) is written:
W1(x) =
∑
y∈supp[Γ2]
u1(β(x, y))Pr(Γ2 = y|Γ1 = x)dy (2)
Note that W1(1) = W2(0) = W1(0) = W2(1) = 0; if either players’ experiment
generates a fully revealing interim belief then the other experiment is irrelevant. Two
special cases are important. When Γ2 = Γ
FR then, regardless of u1 or the prior, W1(x) = 0
for all x. This is because Γ2 will reveal the state to be 0 or 1; any interim belief sender
1 produces can only affect the relative probability of these events, both of which yield
u1 = 0. Meanwhile, when Γ2 = Γ
U , then W1(x) = u1(x) as x will be the receiver’s
posterior.
3.1 Analysis
The result below will be useful.
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium (Γ1,Γ2):
(1) U1(Γ1,Γ2) = U2(Γ1,Γ2) = 0.
(2) W1(x) ≤ 0 and W2(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1].
We provide a formal proof in Supplementary Appendix A, but the logic is straight-
forward. Property (1) follows from the game being zero-sum and the observation that
each sender i can guarantee a payoff Ui = 0 by fully revealing the state. While property
(1) says that sender equilibrium payoffs equal those from full revelation, it does not say
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that we must have full revelation in equilibrium: for instance if the u1 and u2 are linear,
any (Γ1,Γ2) constitute an equilibrium.
Property (2) holds because any violation leads to a contradiction of (1). Fix any Γj
such that sender i 6= j has Wi(x) > 0 for some x. We can find a Γi with support only on
{x, 0, 1}; as i gets strictly positive expected utility whenever x is realized and 0 otherwise,
Ui(Γi,Γj) > 0. Hence such Γj cannot be played in equilibrium.
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The main result for the two-sender binary-state case relies on Lemma 1. We show
that if utility functions are nonlinear, then in equilibrium at least one sender i must choose
Γi = Γ
FR, or else Wj(x) will violate property (2).
Proposition 1. The state is fully revealed in every equilibrium if and only if u1 is non-
linear.
The ‘only if’ direction is trivial —if u1 is linear then senders are indifferent between
all strategy profiles. Hence the result can be restated as:
There is full relevation in every equilibrium
⇐⇒ ∃(Γ1,Γ2), (Γ′1,Γ′2) and a sender i with Ui(Γ1,Γ2) 6= Ui(Γ′1,Γ′2).
We discuss the intuition and sketch the proof but leave details to Supplementary
Appendix A. In the rest of this section we discuss the ‘if’ direction: u1 nonlinear =⇒
full revelation in every equilibrium.
The idea can be seen using the example in Figure 1 with any prior. Note that for
all r ∈ [0.6, 1), u1(β) > 0 for all β ∈ [r, 1); fix any such r. Suppose for contradiction
that sender 2 plays a non-fully revealing strategy Γ2 in some equilibrium. As Γ2 6= ΓFR,
Pr(0 < Γ2 < 1) > 0; let y = min supp[Γ2] \ {0, 1} ∈ (0, 1) be in the smallest interior belief
in the support of Γ2. Using the definition of β(x, y), define x by β(x, y) = r. Conditional
on Γ1 = x ∈ [x, 1), β(x, y) ∈ [r, 1) for all interior y in Γ2’s support. But then for all
x ∈ [x, 1) we have:
11As an example consider u1 in Figure 1 with Γ2 = Γ
U . Then W1(0.6) = 0.4 so sender 1 can generate
U1(Γ1,Γ2) > 0 with Γ1 putting support on {0, 0.6, 1}.
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W1(x) = u1(β(x, 0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Pr(Γ2 = 0|Γ1 = x) + u1(β(x, 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Pr(Γ2 = 1|Γ1 = x)+
∑
y∈supp[Γ2]\{0,1}
u1(β(x, y))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
Pr(Γ2 = y|Γ1 = x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0.
This contradicts Lemma 1 property (2).
The broader intuition is as follows. We say a sender i has an advantage on any
subset of [0, 1] on which ui is strictly positive; for instance in the example, sender 1 has
an advantage on [0.6, 1).12 While senders would like the receiver’s posterior to fall in
their regions of advantage with high probability, neither sender’s experiment unilaterally
controls the posterior. However, in the example sender 1 has an advantage at the end of
the unit interval, [r, 1). If sender 2 chooses Γ2 that is interior with positive probability
then sender 1 can find extreme enough interim beliefs x ≥ x guaranteeing that, conditional
on x being realized and Γ2 being interior, the receiver’s posterior is in [r, 1). Whenever
Γ2 fully reveals the state both senders get utility 0, and so overall sender 1 gets a strictly
positive expected payoff from generating an interim belief x ∈ [x, 1); Lemma 1 says this
is not possible in equilibrium.
This argument does not depend on the specific u1 in the example. As β → 1,
whenever u1 approaches u1(1) = 0 from above, as is the case in the example, we can find
an r ∈ (0, 1) such that sender 1 has an advantage on [r, 1). Hence for any such u1, we can
replicate the same argument to show that any Γ2 6= ΓFR cannot be played in equilibrium.
If u1 approaches 0 from below as β → 1 then u2 must approach from above, and so we
must have Γ1 = Γ
FR in any equilibrium. The same argument applies whenever u1 or u2
approach 0 from above as β → 0.
As u1, u2 are piecewise analytic, there is only one other case to consider: u1, u2
nonlinear and u1(β) = u2(β) = 0 for all β in some neighborhoods of both 0 and 1. Here
too there will be a sender with a region of advantage closest to the ends of [0, 1] who can
find a violation of Lemma 1 property (2) whenever her opponent does not fully reveal the
state. Let r = sup{β ∈ [0, 1] : u1(β) 6= 0} be the supremum of posteriors at which u1, u2
are nonlinear (note r < 1). WLOG, assume either u1(r) > 0 or u1(r
−) > 0 (piecewise
12We use the word advantage because Lemma 1 tells us that both senders will get ex-ante expected
utility 0 in equilibrium. Any posteriors that yield strictly better utility than this for a sender are relatively
advantageous to that sender.
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analycity implies this must hold for either u1 or u2). Suppose Γ2 6= ΓFR. Defining y and
x as before, if u1(r) > 0, then W1(x) = u1(r)Pr(Γ2 = y|Γ1 = x) > 0. If u1(r−) > 0, then
W1(x− ) > 0 for small enough  > 0.
4 Main Result
Now we apply the logic from the previous section to N ≥ 2 states and M ≥ 2 senders. For
any T ≥ 1 and experiments Γ1, ...,ΓT , let β(Γ1, ...,ΓT ) be the receiver’s posterior belief
after observing all T realizations. First note Lemma 1 extends to this setting (the logic
is the same).
For any strategy profile (Γ1, ...,ΓM) and subset of states Ω
′ ⊆ Ω, we say Ω′ is not
pooled if Pr(βl(Γ1, ...,ΓM) > 0 ∀l ∈ Ω′) = 0 (otherwise, Ω′ is pooled). When Ω′ is not
pooled, the receiver will always be able to rule out at least one of the states in the set.
For any Ω′ ⊆ Ω, let ∆(Ω′) = {γ ∈ ∆(Ω) : ∑l∈Ω′ γl = 1} be the subset of the simplex
assigning probability 1 to ω ∈ Ω′. Note that for two states l, k, ∆({l, k}) is the edge of
the simplex between δl and δk. Hence Proposition 1 can be restated as: states 0, 1 are not
pooled in every equilibrium if and only if some ui is nonlinear on ∆({0, 1}). Proposition
2 generalizes Proposition 1 and characterizes when any subset of states is not pooled in
every equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Consider any Ω′ ⊆ Ω. No equilibrium pools Ω′ if and only if for some
sender i ui is nonlinear on ∆(Ω
′).
Suppose the receiver learns that ω ∈ Ω′ ⊆ Ω. Conditional on this event, if ui is
linear on ∆(Ω′) for all i then all senders are indifferent across all additional information
that can be revealed. Meanwhile, if for some i ui is nonlinear on ∆(Ω
′), then there is
some additional experiment that i either strictly prefers or disprefers to not providing
any additional information. Proposition 2 says that conditional on the receiver learning
that ω ∈ Ω′, some sender having strict preferences over revealing additional information
characterizes Ω′ being not pooled in every equilibrium. One important implication is that
revealing no information, the strategy profile (ΓU , ...,ΓU), is an equilibrium if and only if
all senders are indifferent across all strategy profiles.
We give the broad idea of the proof here and give a detailed proof sketch in the
Appendix. The full proof is in Supplementary Appendix A. The ‘only if’ direction is
straightforward; if all ui are linear on ∆(Ω
′) then all senders fully revealing the state
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whenever ω ∈ Ω \Ω′ and revealing no further information whenever ω ∈ Ω′ is a non-fully
revealing equilibrium.
Now for the ‘if’ direction. For any Ω′ ⊆ Ω and sender i, fixing an opponent strategy
Γ−i consider Wi(x) on ∆(Ω′). First note that Γi = x ∈ ∆(Ω′) =⇒ β(x,Γ−i) ∈ ∆(Ω′)
w.p. 1. Generating an interim belief in ∆(Ω′) tells the receiver that ω ∈ Ω′, ensuring
the posterior is also on this set. Conditional on x ∈ ∆(Ω′), the only information Γ−i
can convey is relative probabilities of states in Ω′. When evaluating Wi(x) on ∆(Ω′),
sender i can treat Γ−i as an experiment just about states in Ω′. If some ui is nonaffine
on ∆(Ω′) we can apply a similar argument to Proposition 1. Firstly, at least one sender
has an advantage somewhere on ∆(Ω′). We can find some sender j such that whenever
Pr(Γ−j = y s.t. yl > 0 ∀l ∈ Ω′) > 0 (i.e. Γ−j pools Ω′), Wj(x′) > 0 for some x′ ∈ ∆(Ω′).
Like in Proposition 1, x′ will be extreme enough —close enough to the boundaries of ∆(Ω′)
—to ensure that whenever Γ−j assigns positive probability to all states in Ω′, β(x′,Γ−j)
falls in a region of j’s advantage with positive probability. Otherwise, β(x′,Γ−j) will fall
where j gets 0 utility. Hence Wj(x
′) > 0, violating Lemma 1 and implying that Γ−j must
not pool Ω′ in equilibrium.
Whenever no pair of states can be pooled in any equilibrium, the state is fully revealed
all equilibria. Applying Proposition 2 to every pair of states:
Theorem 1. The state is fully revealed in every equilibrium if and only if for every pair
of states l and k there exists sender i with ui nonlinear on ∆(l, k).
This is an immediate corollary of Proposition 2. Theorem 1 shows that preferences
being sufficiently nonlinear characterizes all equilibria being fully revealing. The state
may not be fully revealed only if all senders have linear preferences on an edge of the
simplex. Linearity along any edge for any sender, let alone all senders, is knife-edge and
so for typical sender preferences the state is fully revealed in all equilibria.
Thus far, senders’ preferences have been defined over posterior beliefs. Theorem 1
yields a clean result when preferences can be microfounded by modeling a single receiver
choosing from a finite set of actions. Suppose after observing all experiment realizations
the receiver takes an action a and receives a payoff ur(a, ω) while each sender i gets
payoff ui(a, ω). We make the generic assumption that no agent is indifferent between any
actions at any state and assume the receiver uses a fixed tie-breaking rule when indifferent
between actions.
In the space of posteriors, senders have piecewise linear utility functions. These
functions are linear on subset ∆(Ω′) if and only if the receiver has the same best action
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at every state in Ω′. By Proposition 2, Ω′ ⊆ Ω is not pooled in every equilibrium if and
only if the receiver has different best actions at some states in Ω′. This implies a version
of Theorem 1: the state is fully revealed in every equilibrium if and only if the receiver
has a different best action at every state. Further, when states are pooled in equilibrium,
additional information would not change the receiver’s action. Hence the receiver always
learns enough take her first best action. See Supplementary Appendix B for formal details.
5 Discussion
Robustness to zero-sumness. Using standard upper hemicontinuity arguments, we
can show Theorem 1 is robust.
Result. Suppose senders’ utility functions converge to zero-sum and utilities are
sufficiently nonlinear in the limit. Whenever convergent, the information revealed along
any sequence of equilibria converges to full revelation.13
Robustness is one reason we focus on conditions for full revelation in all equilibria.
Note that if the limiting preferences are linear on every edge of the simplex, it is still pos-
sible for the information revealed in all equilibria to converge to full revelation. Examples
are provided and the result is formalized in Supplementary Appendix B.
Private Information. Suppose when the game begins each sender receives a private
signal. We assume these signals are bounded14 and realized from finite signal conditionally
independent experiments. In equilibrium, senders could potentially signal their private
information through their choice of experiment. However, for ‘most’ sender preferences
the takeaway from Theorem 1 remains the same.
Result. Suppose senders receive private signals before the game. In all but a knife-
edge case of preferences, the state is fully revealed in every equilibrium.
The knife-edge case includes all senders having linear utility on every edge of the
simplex. Details are in Supplementary Appendix B but the logic is similar to the baseline
model.
Experiments without finite signals. We have focused on finite signal equilibria
13Convergence for utilities is in the sup norm. For information, the notion is convergence in distribution
of the receiver’s posterior.
14They induce beliefs bounded away from the simplex’s boundaries.
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because the results are clean. We show in Supplementary Appendix B that the same
intuition applies when senders can choose any experiments. However in this case we have
a sufficient condition for full revelation in every equilibrium —satisfied in all but a knife-
edge case —but not a necessary one.15 This result is most similar to that of Dworczak
and Pavan (2020).
Piecewise analytic utility. Our assumption that utility functions are piecewise
analytic is not necessary for Theorem 1. We just need to rule out pathological utility
functions that, under our normalization, take values oscillating infinitely about 0 on any
edge of the simplex.
Comparison to Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017). GK (2017) obtains a very
similar result to ours in a different setting. They consider a game in which senders are
allowed to arbitrarily correlate their signal realizations and show that nonlinearity on
every edge of the simplex guarantees full revelation in every equilibrium. Our conditonal
independence assumption makes this paper different for three reasons. For applications,
conditional independence corresponds to senders conducting investigations independently,
which is an important benchmark. Secondly, our results still go through if senders are
allowed to correlate (to any extent) their experiments’ realizations. This is because our
proofs primarily relied on senders being able to deviate to experiments which are con-
ditionally independent of their opponents’. Even when senders are allowed to correlate
signal realizations, this is still possible.
Result: Suppose each sender’s strategy space contains only finite signal experiments
and includes every finite signal conditionally independent experiment. Then Propositions
1 and 2 and Theorem 1 hold (regardless of what correlated experiments are also available).
This result combined with Theorem 1 nests the zero-sum result of GK (2017) with
the caveats that we assume piecewise analytic utility functions and restrict strategy spaces
to finite signal experiments.
Finally it’s important to note the forces that deliver the full revelation results in both
papers are different. In GK (2017), ability to correlate experiments gives each sender much
more control over the posterior. Given any Γ−i played by her opponents, a sender i can
play a different experiment for each realization of Γ−i. Senders’ ability to manipulate
the posterior belief by belief makes Proposition 2, and hence Theorem 1, much easier to
prove. In our setting senders have less control over posteriors; the strongest tool a sender
has is using extreme interim beliefs to ensure poteriors are similarly extreme.
15The sufficient condition is the same as that in our private information result.
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Timing and Relationship to Dworczak and Pavan (2020). See Section 1 for
a description of DP (2020). One difference between our model and DP’s is timing. In
their model with conditionally independent experiments, nature can condition her choice
of experiment on the persuader’s choice. This is similar to a version of our model with two
senders moving sequentially. In a sequential version of our model, senders 1, ...,M move
in order observing all previous experiment choices (but not realizations); we are interested
in subgame perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) of this game. Note that for each simultaneous
game there are multiple corresponding sequential games, one for each ordering of senders.
The following result helps clarify the relationship between the our baseline model and a
sequential version.
Result. If for u1, ..., uM there is full revelation in every SPNE of the sequential game
with the senders moving in some order, then there is full revelation in every equilibrium
of the simultaneous game.
We prove the result Supplementary Appendix B and also show that the converse
does not hold. The result shows that we are guaranteed full revelation in equilibrium
for a (weakly) larger set of sender preferences with simultaneity than with sequentiality.
This is in line with Norman and Li (2018a) and Wu (2017), which show that simultaneous
persuasion cannot generate less information than sequential.16
Differences in timing are one reason our full revelation results are starker than those
of DP. Our results are also stronger due to our focus on equilibria in finite signals. Finally,
while our results concern the total information revealed by multiple senders, their results
emphasize only the information revealed by a single persuader (less so their opponent
—nature). Formally, our condition for a set Ω′ ⊆ Ω to be not pooled in every equilibrium
is equivalent to the persuader in DP’s model having a unique optimal strategy of not
pooling Ω′ or nature minimizing her payoff by not pooling Ω′.
6 Appendix
Proof Sketch of Proposition 2.
The ‘only if’ direction is straightforward. The approach to proving the ‘if’ direction
is similar to that of Proposition 1. Suppose some uj is nonlinear on ∆(Ω
′). Fix a strategy
16However both papers allow senders to correlate experiments arbitrarily. Wu (2017) also considers
zero-sum games, but only shows existence of a fully revealing equilibrium.
14
profile (Γ1, ...,ΓM) that pools Ω
′ and let Γ be the experiment induced by observing the
realizations of all M experiments; we show, via violation of Lemma 1 property (1) (gener-
alized to N ≥ 2,M ≥ 2), that this is not an equilibrium. To do this it sufficies to identify
a sender i and an interim belief x such that E[ui(β(x,Γ))] > 0. As in the proof of Lemma
1 property (2), i can then construct an experiment Γ′i with support on {δ1, ..., δN , x} and
obtain a strictly positive payoff by playing Γ′i in addition to, conditionally independently,
Γi. In the binary-state case i was a sender who had an advantage at points closest to
the extremes of the [0, 1] interval. This idea is simply generalized when N and/or Ω′ are
larger.
Let ∆int(Ω′) = {γ ∈ ∆(Ω′) : γl > 0 ∀l ∈ Ω′}; this is the set of beliefs in ∆(Ω′) whose
support is Ω′. We first make some simple observations (proofs are trivial and omitted).
Observation 1. Conditional on an interim belief x ∈ ∆int(Ω′) being realized, the
following hold. (1) β(x,Γ) ∈ ∆(Ω′) w.p 1 as x has ruled out states Ω \ Ω′. (2) β(x,Γ) ∈
∆int(Ω′) if and only if Γ assigns positive probability to all states in Ω′. (3) Realizations
of Γ that assign probability 0 to Ω′ occur w.p. 0.
The case of |Ω′| = 2 is simple.17 Conditional on interim beliefs x ∈ ∆int({l, k}),
β(x,Γ) ∈ ∆({l, k}) (Observation 1) and so we are in a binary-state world. We can
identify sender i and x similarly Proposition 1 —the extension from two to M > 2
senders is straigtforward.
To see how to extend the result to |Ω′| > 2, first consider an example with N = 3
and Ω′ = Ω. Let A = {γ ∈ ∆(Ω) : uj(γ) > 0 for some j} be the set of posteriors at which
some sender has an advantage and let cl(A) be its closure. Note that by zero-sumness, at
all posteriors outside A all senders get 0 utility. Suppose cl(A) is as shown in Figure 2.
17Note we only need Proposition 2 with |Ω′| = 2 to prove Theorem 1.
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Figure 2
It is convenient to represent each belief γ ∈ ∆(Ω) by two ratios: r2(γ) = γ2γ3 and
r1(γ) =
γ1
γ2+γ3
.18 As in Figure 2 cl(A) does not touch the boundaries of ∆(Ω), we can
find r¯2 = maxγ∈cl(A) r2(γ) with 0 < r¯2 < ∞; the dotted line shows points γ ∈ ∆(Ω) with
r2(γ) = r¯2. Amongst the points in argmaxγ∈cl(A)r2(γ), we can then identify a unique
point, β¯ ∈ ∆int(Ω), with the largest r1 ratio (see Figure 2). We will find x∗ ∈ ∆int(Ω)
conditional on which the posterior will either fall outside of cl(A) (yielding payoff 0) or
will equal β¯. A sender who has an advantage at or near β¯ will hence be able to get strictly
positive utility by generating an interim belief at, or near, x∗.
Let Z = {γ ∈ supp[Γ] : γ1, γ2, γ3 > 0} (note Z is nonempty). Conditional on
generating x ∈ ∆int(Ω), all beliefs in the support of Γ that are not in Z can be ignored
as they will result in posteriors on the boundaries of ∆(Ω) and hence, in the example,
yield utility 0. Consider interim beliefs x ∈ ∆({2, 3}); for all y ∈ Z, as x→ δ2, β(x, y)→
δ2 =⇒ r2(β(x, y)) → ∞ and as x → δ3, β(x, y) → δ3 =⇒ r2(β(x, y)) → 0. The
finiteness of Z, continuity of Bayesian updating, and intermediate value theorem together
imply that there exists x′ ∈ ∆({2, 3}) such that miny∈Z r2(β(x′, y)) = r¯2. Next consider
taking a convex combination of x′ and δ1: λδ1 +(1−λ)x′; as λ→ 1, β(λδ1 +(1−λ)x′, y)→
δ1 for all y ∈ Z. While r1(λδ1 + (1 − λ)x′) changes in λ, r2(λδ1 + (1 − λ)x′) does not as
λ does not affect the relative probabilities assigned to states 2 and 3. As a consequence,
λ also does not affect r2(β(λδ1 + (1− λ)x′, y)) for any y ∈ Z. Hence by the intermediate
18These are not well defined for all γ, but this won’t be a problem in our example.
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value theorem we can find λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) and x∗ = λ∗δ1 + (1− λ∗)x′ such that:
(1) min
y∈Z
r2(β(x
∗, y)) = r¯2
(2) min
y′∈argminy∈Zr2(β(x∗,y))
r1(β(x
∗, y′)) = r1(β¯)
(3)
Hence for all y ∈ Z, we have either β(x∗, y) = β¯ or β(x∗, y) 6∈ cl(A). Posteriors for
which the latter is true will fall either to the left of the dotted line in Figure 2 or on the
dotted line and (strictly) above β¯. If β¯ ∈ A, then set x = x∗ and E[ui(β(x,Γ))] > 0 for
some i. If β¯ 6∈ A, then there exists some β′ ∈ A close to β¯ and x close to x∗ such that
either β(x, y) = β′ or β(x, y) 6∈ cl(A) for all y ∈ Z.
The steps in proving the existence of x generalize beyond this example. Due to
Observation 1, the same logic applies for N > 3 and Ω′ = {1, 2, 3} whenever cl(A) ∩
∆(Ω′) ⊂ ∆int(Ω′) (i.e. cl(A) does not touch the boundaries of ∆(Ω′)). If |Ω′| = K > 3,
whenever cl(A) ∩ ∆(Ω′) ⊂ ∆int(Ω′) we can extend the ratio representation of a belief γ
to ratios r1(γ), ..., rK−1(γ) and iterate the same procedure to find r¯1, ..., r¯K−2 and β¯. x∗
will now have to satisfy K − 1 equations analogous to those in equation 3. The case of
cl(A) ∩ ∆(Ω′) 6⊂ ∆int(Ω′) requires additional details and we leave it to Supplementary
Appendix A.
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A Supplementary Appendix A: Proofs
Definitions and Facts. The following definitions and facts are used in both Supple-
mentary Appendix A and B.
Let P be the set of Bayes-plausible finite support elements of ∆(∆(Ω)). It will be
convenient to talk about a strategy for sender i as a choice of interim belief Γi with
probability mass function pi ∈ P (in the text of the paper we did not introduce notation
for the distribution of Γi).
For any strategy profile (Γ1, ...,ΓM) and subset of senders S ⊆ {1, ...,M}, let the
random variable ΓS be the receiver’s belief after observing realizations of {Γj}j∈S but not
the realizations of {Γj}j 6∈S; let pS be it’s probability mass function and pS(·|ω = k) be its
18
probability mass function conditional on the state being k. Let Γ−S and p−S be the same
objects for the complementary set of senders.
For any disjoint subsets of senders S, S ′ ⊂ {1, ...,M} and any fixed strategy profile
(Γ1, ...,ΓM), let pS′(·|x) be the probability mass function of ΓS′ conditional on ΓS = x.
pS′(y|x) =
∑
k∈Ω
pS′(y|ω = k, x)Pr(ω = k|ΓS = x) =
∑
k∈Ω
pS′(y|ω = k)xk =
∑
k∈Ω
Pr(ω = k|y)pS′(y)
Pr(ω = k)
xk
=
∑
k∈Ω
xkykpS′(y)
pik
(A.1)
Where the second equality comes from conditional independence of ΓS and ΓS′ . Claim
A.1 tells us that conditional on ΓS, with probability 1 ΓS′ assigns positive probability to
at least one state that ΓS assigns positive probability to (i.e. ΓS′ cannot contradict ΓS).
This is a simple implication of Bayesian updating.
Claim A.1. For any disjoint subset of senders S, S ′, ΓS,ΓS′, and x ∈ ∆(Ω): pS′(y|x) = 0
for all y s.t. yl = 0 for all l ∈ Ω for which xl > 0. Further, there exists y ∈ supp[ΓS′ ]
such that ps′(y|x) > 0.
Proof. The first statement, that pS′(y|x) = 0 for all y such that yl = 0 for all l for which
xl > 0, follows immediately from Equation A.1. The second statement follows from Bayes-
plausibility of ΓS′ . For every l such that xl > 0, as pil > 0, there exists y ∈ supp[ΓS′ ] with
yl ≥ pil > 0; by Equation A.1, p(y|x) > 0 for such a y.
Let βl(x
1, ..., xM) = Pr(ω = l|x1, ..., xM) be the receiver’s posterior belief that ω = l
after observing experiment realizations Γ1 = x
1, ...,ΓM = x
M . By Bayes rule:
βl(x
1, ..., xM) =
Pr(Γ1 = x
1, ...,ΓM = x
M |ω = l)Pr(ω = l)
Pr(Γ1 = x1, ...,ΓM = xM)
=
ΠMi=1pi(x
i|ω = l)pil∑N
k=1 Π
M
i=1pi(x
i|ω = k)Pr(ω = k) =
ΠMi=1
Pr(ω=l|xi)pi(xi)
Pr(ω=l)
pil∑N
k=1 Π
M
i=1
Pr(ω=k|xi)pi(xi)
Pr(ω=k)
pik
=
ΠMi=1x
i
l/pi
M−1
l∑N
k=1 Π
M
i=1x
i
k/pi
M−1
k
(A.2)
Where the second equality uses the conditional independence of Γ1, ...,ΓM . Note that
βl is not well defined when for each state k ∈ Ω there exists sender j with xjk = 0. However
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it is straightforward to see by applying Claim A.1 that such a realization of (Γ1, ...,ΓM)
occurs with zero probability; after viewing the realizations of any number of experiments,
the Bayesian receiver will have a well defined posterior w.p. 1.
For any strategy profile (Γ1, ...,ΓM) and disjoint sets of senders S1, ..., ST , we similarly
define define the receiver’s posterior as a function of interim belief realizations from each
experiment: {ΓSs = ySs}s=1,...,T .
βl(y
S1 , ..., yST ) =
ΠTs=1y
Ss
l /pi
T−1
l∑N
k=1 Π
T
s=1y
Ss
k /pi
T−1
k
(A.3)
Note: ΓS1∪...∪ST = β(ΓS1 , ...,ΓST ), as both define the receiver’s belief after observing
realizations of ΓS1 , ...,ΓST .
Claim A.2 shows that if any subset of experiments in a strategy profile generate an
interim belief in ∆(Ω′) then the posterior will fall in ∆(Ω′) w.p. 1.
Claim A.2. For any strategy profile (Γ1, ...,ΓM), disjoint subsets of senders S1, ..., ST ,
and states Ω′ ⊆ Ω, if ΓS1 ∈ ∆(Ω′) then β(ΓS1 , ...,ΓST ) ∈ ∆(Ω′) w.p. 1.
Proof. This can be seen from the definition of β(yS1 , ..., yST ) which implies βl(y
S1 , ..., yST ) =
0 for all l 6∈ Ω′. After observing ΓS1 ∈ ∆(Ω′), the receiver updates to an interim belief
assigning 0 probability to all states outside of Ω′. No additional information can change
this.
Claim A.3. For any strategy profile (Γ1, ...,ΓM), Ω
′ ⊆ Ω, and any subsets of senders S:
If ΓS does not pool Ω
′ then (Γ1, ...,ΓM) does not either.
Proof. Let S ′ = {1, ...,M} \ {S}. As ΓS does not pool Ω′, then Pr(ΓS = y : s.t. yl >
0 ∀l ∈ Ω′) = 0. If ΓS = y, ΓS′ = y′, then by Equation A.3, if yl = 0 then βl(y, y′) = 0.
Hence as w.p. 1 ΓS assigns 0 probability to at least one state in Ω
′, β(ΓS,ΓS′) does as
well and so (Γ1, ...,ΓM) does not pool Ω
′.
A.1 Section 2
Normalization of utility functions. Here we show that we can normalize ui(δl) = 0 for
all i = 1, ..., N , l = 1, ...,M without changing senders’ preferences over strategy profiles
or the zero-sumness of the game.
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Suppose senders have utility functions u′1, ..., u
′
M with u
′
1 + ... + u
′
M = 0 for all β.
For i = 1, ..,M let αi : ∆(Ω) → R be the affine function αi(β) = −
∑
l βlui(δl). For
each i, define the function ui : ∆(Ω) → R as ui = u′i + αi. Then ui(δl) = 0 for all
i, l = 1, ..., N . Note that utility function ui preserves the same preferences over strat-
egy profiles as u′i, as for any strategy profile (Γ1, ..., .ΓM), Ep1,...,pM [ui(β(Γ1, ...,ΓM))] =
Ep1,...,pM [u′i(β(Γ1, ...,ΓM))]−
∑
l pilui(δl) - the latter term is a constant. Finally note that
α1(β) + ...+ αM(β) = 0 for all β ∈ ∆(Ω), so u1 + ....+ uM = 0.
A.2 Section 3
Lemma 1. General Case: In any equilibrium (Γ1, ...,ΓM): (1) Ui(Γ1, ...,ΓM) = 0 for
i = 1, ...,M and (2) Wi(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ ∆(Ω) and i = 1, ...,M .
Proof. We prove (1) first. First note that as the functions {ui}i=1,...,M are zero-sum, so are
{Ui}i. To see this, fix any (Γ′1, ...,Γ′M) and let Γ′ be the random variable representing the
receiver’s posterior after viewing all M experiment realizations and p′ be its pmf. Then∑M
i=1 Ui(Γ
′
1, ...,Γ
′
M) =
∑
i
∑
β∈supp[Γ′] ui(β)p
′(β) =
∑
β∈supp[Γ′] p
′(β)
∑
i ui(β) = 0. Next
note that any sender i choosing Γi = Γ
FR yields Ui(Γ
FR,Γ−i) = 0 for all Γ−i. Hence in
any equilibrium (Γ1, ...,ΓM), each sender gets Ui(Γ1, ...,ΓM) ≥ 0. Finally no sender can
have Ui(Γ1, ...,ΓM) > 0 as this would imply Uj(Γ1, ...,ΓM) < 0 for some j 6= i.
For (2) we prove the contrapositive. Fix any sender i and opponents’ strategy profile
Γ−i such that Wi(x) > 0 for some x ∈ ∆(Ω); we will show Γ−i cannot be played in
equilibrium. Consider the strategy Γ′i with distribution p
′
i and support only on x and
{δl}l=1,...,N . Set p′i(x) > 0 small enough such that pil − xlp′i(x) > 0 for all l (such a
value exists as pil > 0 for all l). Bayes-plausibility implies we must have: p
′
i(δl) = pil −
xlp
′
i(x) > 0 for all states l (as the support of Γ
′
i is {x, δ1, ..., δM}). Then Ui(Γ′i,Γ−i) =
Wi(x)p
′
i(x) +
∑
l ui(δl)p
′
i(δl) > 0. Property (1) of the lemma implies Γ−i cannot be played
in equilibrium; hence Wi(x) ≤ 0 for all i in any equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Proposition 1 is implied by Proposition 2, proven in the next section.
However, as the proving Proposition 1 is much simpler than Proposition 2, we provide a
proof here for exposition.
Proof. The ‘only if’ direction is trivial. If u1 is linear so is u2. Under our normalization
of u1(0) = u1(1) = 0, this implies that u1(β) = u2(β) = 0 for all β ∈ [0, 1]. Hence both
senders are indifferent across all strategy profiles and any (Γ1,Γ2) is an equilibrium.
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Now for the ‘if’ direction. Suppose u1 (and hence u2) are nonlinear. Let q = sup{β ∈
[0, 1] : u1(β) 6= 0} be the supremum of posteriors at which u1, u2 are nonlinear. We prove
the result in two cases.
Case 1: q = 1. If q = 1, then by the piecewise analycity of u1, u2, there exists r < 1
such that either u1(β) > 0 or u1(β) < 0 for all β ∈ [r, 1). If u1(β) < 0 then u2(β) > 0,
and so WLOG (we can always relabel senders) we assume u1(β) > 0 for all β ∈ [r, 1).
Suppose for contradiction that sender 2 plays a non-fully revealing strategy Γ2 in some
equilibrium. As Γ2 6= ΓFR, Pr(0 < Γ2 < 1) > 0; let y = min supp[Γ2] \ {0, 1} ∈ (0, 1) be
in the smallest interior belief in the support of Γ2. Using the definition of β(x, y), define
x by β(x, y) = r. Conditional on Γ1 = x ∈ [x, 1), β(x, y) ∈ [r, 1) for all interior y in Γ2’s
support. But then for all x ∈ [x, 1) we have:
W1(x) = u1(β(x, 0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Pr(Γ2 = 0|Γ1 = x) + u1(β(x, 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Pr(Γ2 = 1|Γ1 = x)+
∑
y∈supp[Γ2]\{0,1}
u1(β(x, y))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
Pr(Γ2 = y|Γ1 = x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0.
This contradicts Lemma 1 property (2) and hence Γ2 = Γ
FR in all equilibria.
Case 2: q < 1. We break this case into two subcases.
First suppose u1(q) 6= 0. WLOG assume u1(q) > 0 (if not then u2(q) > 0). Suppose
for contradiction Γ2 6= ΓFR in some equilibrium. Then let r = q and define y, x as before.
Again Lemma 1 prpoerty (2) is violated as:
W1(x) = u1(β(x, 0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Pr(Γ2 = 0|Γ1 = x) + u1(β(x, 1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Pr(Γ2 = 1|Γ1 = x)+
∑
y∈supp[Γ2]\{0,1,y}
u1(β(x, y))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Pr(Γ2 = y|Γ1 = x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0 + u1(β(x, y))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=u1(r)>0
Pr(Γ2 = y|Γ1 = x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0.
Now suppose u1(q) = u2(q) = 0. Then by piecewise analycity of utilities either
u1(q
−) > 0 or u2(q−) > 0. WLOG assume u1(q−) > 0 and suppose for contradiction
Γ2 6= ΓFR in some equilibrium. Define y as before. There exists r < q and x such that
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u1 > 0 on interval [r, q) and β(x, y) = r. Then we have W1(x) > 0, violating Lemma 1
property (2).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
A.3.1 ‘Only if’ direction.
Suppose for some Ω′ ⊆ Ω all senders have linear utilities on ∆(Ω′). Let x′ ∈ ∆(Ω′) with
x′k =
pik∑
n∈Ω′ pin
∀k ∈ Ω′. Consider the experiment Γ′ with Pr(Γ′ = δl) = pil for all l 6∈ Ω′
and Pr(Γ′ = x′) =
∑
n∈Ω′ pin. Γ
′ is Bayes-plausible and has finite support. The strategy
profile (Γ′, ...,Γ′) is an non-fully revealing equilibrium. To see this consider a sender i’s
incentive to deviate. If ω ∈ Ω′ then Γ−i ∈ ∆(Ω′) =⇒ β(Γ1, ...,ΓM) ∈ ∆(Ω′) w.p. 1
(Claim 2); as ui is linear on ∆(Ω
′), i has no profitable deviation conditional on ω ∈ Ω′.
Conditional on ω 6∈ Ω′, Γ−i fully reveals the state and no deviation from i can change
this.
A.3.2 ‘If’ direction.
Let ∆int(Ω′) = {γ ∈ ∆(Ω′) : γl > 0 ∀l ∈ Ω′}; this is the set of beliefs in ∆(Ω′) whose
support is Ω′.
We first prove the result for the case of |Ω′| = 2. This case is simpler than the case
of |Ω′| > 2 and is of particular interest because Theorem 1 only relies on Proposition 2
with |Ω′| = 2.
Proof for |Ω′| = 2.
Proof. WLOG let Ω′ = {1, 2}. Suppose some sender i has ui nonlinear on ∆({1, 2}). For
each sender j′ let r′j′ = sup{t ∈ [0, 1] : uj′(tδ2 + (1 − t)δ1) > 0}. Let r′ = maxj′=1,...,M r′j′
and j ∈ argmaxj′=1,...,Mr′j′ . As ui is nonlinear there exists γ ∈ ∆int({1, 2}) with ui(γ) 6= 0.
If ui(γ) < 0 then ui′(γ) > 0 for some sender i
′ (zero-sumness); otherwise ui(γ) > 0.
Regardless, we have that r′ exists and is > 0.
WLOG let j = 1. We prove the ‘if’ direction in 2 cases.
Case 1: r′ = 1. u1 is piecewise real analytic and so ∆({1, 2}) can be partitioned into
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intervals each of which u1 is real analytic on. Each γ ∈ ∆({1, 2}) can be represented by
scalar γ2 —how close it is to δ2. For some a ∈ [0, 1), u1 is real analytic on an interval {γ ∈
∆({1, 2}) : γ2 ∈ (a, 1)} (this a ∈ [0, 1) is not unique; any selection will do). This implies
that there are a finite number of points (possibly zero) on {γ ∈ ∆({1, 2}) : γ2 ∈ (a, 1)} at
which u1 = 0. As r
′ = 1, there exists r ∈ (a, 1) such that u1(γ) > 0 for all γ ∈ ∆({1, 2})
s.t. γ2 ∈ [r, 1) (again, this r will not be unique; any selection will do).
Suppose, for contradiction, that some equilibrium (Γ1, ...,ΓM) pools {1, 2}. Then we
must must have Pr(Γ−1 = y s.t. y1, y2 > 0) > 0, i.e. Γ−1 pools {1, 2}, by Claim A.3.
Let Z = {y ∈ supp[Γ−1] : y1, y2 > 0}; Z is nonempty. For any x ∈ ∆int({1, 2}) and
y ∈ Z, we have p−1(y|x) > 0 and β(x, y) ∈ ∆int({1, 2}) (by Claim A.2 and equation A.2).
Note that as x → δ1 we have β(x, y) → δ1 =⇒ β2(x, y) → 0 and as x → δ2 we have
β(x, y) → δ2 =⇒ β2(x, y) → 1. As Z is finite, this implies miny∈Z β2(x, y) goes to 0 as
x→ δ1 and miny∈Z β2(x, y) goes to 1 as x→ δ2. As for all y ∈ Z β2(x, y) is continuous in
x for x ∈ ∆int({1, 2}), miny∈Z β2(x, y) is also continuous in x for x ∈ ∆int({1, 2}). By the
intermediate value theorem there exists x ∈ ∆int({1, 2}) such that miny∈Z β2(x, y) = r.
Note that by equation A.2, β(x, y) = δ1 for all y ∈ supp[Γ−1] with y1 > 0 and y2 = 0;
similarly β(x, y) = δ2 for all y ∈ supp[Γ−1] with y2 > 0 and y1 = 0. Finally by Claim A.1,
p−1(y|x) = 0 for all y ∈ supp[Γ−1] with y1 = y2 = 0.
Putting this together:
W1(x) =
∑
y∈supp[Γ−1]
y1=0,y2>0
u1(δ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
p−1(y|x) +
∑
y∈supp[Γ−1]
y2=0,y1>0
u1(δ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
p−1(y|x)
+
∑
y∈Z
u1(β(x, y))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
p−1(y|x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0
This contradicts Lemma 1 property (2). Hence no equilibrium can pool {1, 2}.
Case 2: r′ < 1. First, if u1(r′) > 0, then set r = r′ and derive x just as in Case 1.
As in Case 1, we have W1(x) > 0, violating Lemma 1 property (2). Next if u1(r
′) < 0,
then some sender i 6= 1 must have ui(r′) > 0 (zero-sumness); we can relabel sender i to 1
and repeat the same argument.
Next assume u1(r
′) = 0. Now for some a ∈ [0, r′), u1 is real analytic on an interval
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{γ ∈ ∆({1, 2}) : γ2 ∈ (a, r′)} (this a ∈ [0, r′) is not unique; any selection will do). This
implies that there are a finite number of points (possibly zero) on {γ ∈ ∆({1, 2}) : γ2 ∈
(a, r′)} at which u1 = 0. This implies that there exists r ∈ (a, r′) such that u1(γ) > 0 for
all γ ∈ ∆({1, 2}) with γ2 ∈ [r, r′) (again, this r will not be unique; any selection will do).
Note that u1(γ) ≥ 0 for all γ ∈ ∆({1, 2}) with γ2 ≥ r.
Suppose, for contradiction, that in some equilibrium (Γ1, ...,ΓM) pools {1, 2}. We
follow identical steps in defining Z and x. Note that for all y ∈ Z, βk(x, y) ∈ [r, 1) =⇒
u1(β(x, y)) ≥ 0. By the definition of x, there exists y ∈ Z such that β(x, y) = r =⇒
u1(β(x, y)) > 0. For all y ∈ supp[Γ−1] \Z either β(x, y) ∈ {δ1, δ2} or p−1(y|x) > 0. Hence
W1(x) > 0, violating Lemma 1 property (2).
Now we proceed with the analysis for |Ω′| ≥ 2.
General Analysis.
Suppose some uj is nonlinear on ∆(Ω
′). Fix a strategy profile (Γ1, ...,ΓM) that pools
Ω′; let Γ be the experiment induced by observing the realizations of all M experiments
and p be its probability mass function. We show, via violation of Lemma 1 property (1),
that (Γ1, ...,ΓM) is not an equilibrium. To do this it sufficies to identify a sender j and an
interim belief x such that when Γ1, ...,ΓM are played, conditional on generating interim
belief x (from an experiment played additionally and conditionally independently to Γj)
j gets a strictly positive expected payoff: : E[ui(β(x,Γ))] > 0. As in the proof of Lemma
1 property (2), j can then construct an experiment Γ′j with support on {δ1, ..., δN , x} and
obtain a strictly positive payoff by playing Γ′j in addition to, conditionally independently,
Γj. The remainder of the proof shows that such a sender j and x exist.
For i = 1, ...,M let Ai = {γ ∈ ∆(Ω) : ui(γ) > 0} and Di = {γ ∈ ∆(Ω) : ui(γ) < 0}
be the sets of posteriors at which i has an advantage and disadvantage respectively. Let
A = ∪iAi be the union of these advantage sets (also equal to the union of disadvantage
sets as utilities are zero-sum) and cl(A) be its closure.
We say a subset of states Θ ⊆ Ω (|Θ| > 1) is minimal if A ∩ Θ 6= ∅ and Θ′ ∩ A = ∅
for all Θ′ ⊂ Θ. Note that if A is empty, then there are no minimal subsets. Meanwhile if
A is nonempty, any subset of states that intersects A (i.e. any set Θ for which some ui is
nonlinear on ∆(Θ)) is either minimal or has a minimal subset:
Claim A.4. Every subset Θ ⊆ Ω for which ui (for some i) is nonlinear on ∆(Θ) is either
minimal or has a subset Θ′ that is minimal.
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Proof. If for some i ui is nonlinear on ∆(Θ), then A∩∆(Θ) 6= ∅. Either Θ is minimal, or
there exists a subset Θ′ ⊂ Θ that intersects A. Now set Θ = Θ′ and repeat this process
until Θ is minimal; it must be minimal at some point because Ω is finite and states are
removed from Θ each iteration.
By Claim A.4, it is sufficient to prove Proposition 2 for minimal Ω′ alone. If all
minimal sets cannot be pooled in equilbirium, then any set on which there are nonlinear
sender preferences cannot be pooled, as all such sets have a minimal subset. Henceforth
we assume Ω′ is minimal.
Let |Ω′| = K ≤ N and WLOG let Ω′ = {1, ..., K}.
It is convenient for us to represent any belief γ ∈ ∆(Ω′) by the ratios (r1(γ), ..., rK−1(γ)) ∈
(R+ ∪ {∞})K−1, where for k = 1, ..., K − 1: (1) rk(γ) = γk1−∑kl=1 γl when 1 −
∑k
l=1 γl is
nonzero, (2) when this doesn’t hold rk(γ) =∞ if γk > 0 and rk(γ) = 0 if γk = 0. We call
this the ratio representation of γ. The ratio rk(γ) tells us the ratio of probability mass
assigned to state k by γ to the mass assigned to states k + 1, ..., K.
Lemma A.1. Note for any γ, γ′ ∈ ∆(Ω′) we have rk(γ) = rk(γ′) for all k = 1, ..., K − 1
if and only if γ = γ′; that is, ratio representations for beliefs in ∆(Ω′) are unique.
Proof. The ‘if’ direction is trivial; we prove the ‘only if’ direction as follows. First suppose
rk(γ) < ∞ for all k = 1, ..., K − 1. This implies that 1 −
∑k
l=1 γl is nonzero for all k
(or else, let k′ be the minimum k for which 1 −∑kl=1 γl = 0; but then we must have
γk′ > 0 =⇒ rk′(γ) =∞ —contradiction). But then from its definition, r1 uniquely pins
down γ1 (γ1 =
r1(γ)
1+r1(γ)
), after which r2 pins down γ2, ..., rK−1 pins down γK−1, and γK
is pinned down by 1 =
∑K
l=1 γl). Now suppose rk′′(γ) = ∞ for some k′′. Note that this
implies γk = 0 for all k > k
′′; further, 1−∑kl=1 γl > 0 for all k < k′′ and hence rk(γ) <∞
for all k < k′′. Then γ1, ..., γk′′−1 are uniquely pinned down by using the definitions of
r1(γ), ..., rk′′−1(γ) (just as in the previous case). γk′′ is pinned down by 1 =
∑K
l=1 γl.
The the continuity of rk(γ) on part of ∆(Ω
′) will be useful later:
Claim A.5. For k = 1..., K − 1, rk(γ) is continuous in γ for γ ∈ ∆({k, ..., K}) \ {δk}.
Proof. rk(γ) =
γk
1−∑kl=1γk. As γ ∈ ∆({k, ..., K}), the denominator is strictly positive when
γk < 1 and so rk(γ) is continuous in γ on this domain.
The following simple results will be useful.
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Lemma A.2. Suppose K > 2. For any 1 < L < K, let x ∈ ∆({L, ...,K}), x′ ∈
∆({1, ..., L−1}) and y ∈ ∆(Ω). If β(x, y) is well defined,19 then rk(β(λx′+(1−λ)x, y)) =
rk(β(x, y)) for all k = L, ...,K − 1 and λ ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. For any n ∈ Ω,
βn(λx
′ + (1− λ)x, y) =
(λx′n+(1−λ)xn)yn
pin∑N
n′=1
(λx′
n′+(1−λ)xn′ )yn′
pin′
For k ≥ L:
rk(β((λx
′ + (1− λ)x), y)) = βk((λx
′ + (1− λ)x), y)∑N
n=k+1 βn((λx
′ + (1− λ)x), y) =
(λx′k + (1− λ)xk)yk/pik∑N
n=k+1(λx
′
n + (1− λ)xn)yn/pin
=
(1− λ)xkyk/pik
(1− λ)∑Nn=k+1 xnyn/pin = xkyk/pik∑Nn=k+1 xnyn/pin
whenever the denominator is nonzero; when the denominator is nonzero, this expres-
sion is equal to rk(β(x, y)). When the denominator and numerator are zero, rk(β(λx
′ +
(1 − λ)x, y)) = rk(β(x, y)) = 0 and when the denominator is zero and the numerator is
nonzero, rk(β(λx
′ + (1− λ)x, y)) = rk(β(x, y)) =∞.
Claim A.6. Suppose K > 2. For any 1 < L < K, let x ∈ ∆({L, ...,K}), x′ ∈
∆({1, ..., L−1}) and y ∈ ∆(Ω). If β(x, y) and β(x′, y) are well defined then βk(λx′+ (1−
λ)x, y) = λβk(x
′, y) + (1− λ)βk(x, y) for all λ ∈ [0, 1], k = 1, ..., N .
Proof. Simple algebra.
Let Z = {z ∈ supp[Γ] : zn > 0 for all n ∈ Ω′}. Note Z is nonempty as (Γ1, ...,ΓM)
pools Ω′. For k = 1, ..., K − 1 and x ∈ ∆int(Ω′) define Mx(k) recursively starting with
k = K − 1:
Mx(K − 1) = argminz∈ZrK−1(β(x, z)) (A.4)
19From its definition, one can see β(x, y) is only not well defined when y assigns probability 0 to every
state that x assigns strictly positive probability to.
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Mx(K−1) is nonempty as Z is. For k < K−1, letMx(k) = argminz∈Mx(k+1)rk(β(x, z));
these sets are nonempty for all k. For k = 1, ..., K − 1 define mx(k) by: pick z ∈ Mx(k)
and let mx(k) = rk(β(x, z)). mx(k) is well defined for all k.
Mx(K−1) gives the set of realizations of Γ that, conditional on interim belief x being
realized from a different experiment, would induce the lowest rK−1 ratio of posteriors
among those in Z. mx(K − 1) gives the value of this lowest rK−1 ratio. Mx(K − 2) gives
the subset of Mx(K − 1) that would result in lowest rK−2 ratio of posteriors conditional
on x being realized and mx(K − 2) gives this value, etc.
Note any z ∈Mx(1) must satisfy:
rk(β(x, z)) = mx(k) for all k = 1, ..., K − 1 (A.5)
As β(x, y) ∈ ∆(Ω′) (x ∈ ∆int(Ω′) and Claim A.2), by Lemma A.1, ratiosmx(1), ...,mx(K−
1) uniquely pin down the value of β(x, z) for all z ∈ Mx(1). If we have |Mx(1)| > 1, this
means that multiple realizations of Γ, z 6= z′, produce the same posterior conditional on
x. This is possible when x assigns probability 0 to states z, z′ do not —z and z′ differing
on these states may not affect the posterior.
Using the objects introduced above, we finish proving Proposition 2 in two cases. In
the first case, cl(A) ∩ Ω′′ = ∅ for all Ω′′ ( Ω′. This case include the example in the main
Appendix in the text of paper; the same logic generalizes. The second case to consider is
cl(A) ∩ Ω′′ 6= ∅ for some Ω′′ ( Ω′.
Case 1: cl(A) ∩ Ω′′ = ∅ for all Ω′′ ( Ω′.
Lemma A.3. Suppose cl(A) ∩∆(Ω′′) = ∅ for all Ω′′ ( Ω′. Then there exists x∗ ∈ ∆(Ω′)
and β¯ ∈ cl(A) such that for all y ∈ Z either: (1) β(x∗, y) 6∈ cl(A) or (2) β(x∗, y) = β¯.
Proof. Define the point β¯ ∈ cl(A)∩∆(Ω′) as follows. LetE(K−1) = argmaxγ∈cl(A)∩∆(Ω′) rK−1(γ)
and e(K−1) = maxγ∈cl(A)∩∆(Ω′) rK−1(γ). For k = 1, ..., K−2, let E(k) = argmaxγ∈E(k+1) rk(γ)
and e(k) = maxγ∈E(k+1) rk(γ). Note that as cl(A) ∩∆(Ω′′) = ∅ for all Ω′′ ( Ω′, we have
0 < e(k) < ∞ for all k = 1, ..., K − 1. Further, by Lemma A.1, |E(1)| = 1 as γ ∈ E(1)
must satisfy rk(γ) = e(k) for all k = 1, ..., K − 1. Let β¯ be the unique element in E(1).
Consider x ∈ ∆int({K − 1, K}). Note that as x → δK , β(x, y) → δK =⇒
rK−1(β(x, y)) → 0 for all y ∈ Z. Similarly as x → δK−1, β(x, y) → δK−1 =⇒
rK−1(β(x, y))→∞ for all y ∈ Z. By the finiteness of Z, x→ δK =⇒ miny∈Z rK−1(β(x, y))→
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0 and x → δK−1 =⇒ miny∈Z rK−1(β(x, y)) → ∞. The continiuity of β(x, y) in x,
continuity of rK−1 in β(x, y) (Claim A.5), and finiteness of Z together imply the con-
tinuity of miny∈Z rK−1(β(x, y)) in x. By the intermediate value theorem, there exists
x′ ∈ ∆int({K − 1, K}) with miny∈Z rK−1(β(x′, y)) = e(K − 1), or mx′(K − 1) = e(K − 1).
We prove the result inductively, with the previous paragraph being the base case.
Suppose we have found x′ ∈ ∆({k′ + 1, ..., K}) such that for all k = k′ + 1, ..., K − 1,
mx′(k) = e(k). We find x
′′ ∈ ∆({k′, ..., K}) with mx′′(k) = e(k) for all k = k′, ..., K − 1.
Consider x′(λ) = λδk′ + (1 − λ)x′ for λ ∈ (0, 1). As λ → 1, β(x′(λ), y) → δk′ =⇒
rk′(β(x
′(λ), y))→∞ for all y ∈ Z and as λ→ 0, β(x′(λ), y)→ x′ =⇒ rk′(β(x′(λ), y))→
0 for all y ∈ Z. For all λ ∈ [0, 1), y ∈ Z, k = k′+1, ..., K−1, rk(β(x′(λ), y)) = rk(β(x′, y))
by Lemma A.2; hence changing λ will leave mx′(k) = e(k) for k = k
′ + 1, ..., K − 1. By
finiteness of Mx′(k
′ + 1), continuity of β(x′(λ), y) for all y ∈Mx′(k′ + 1), continuity of rk′
in β(x′(λ), y) for all y ∈ Mx′(k′ + 1), and in the intermediate value theorem, there exists
λ∗ ∈ (0, 1) and x′′ = λ∗δk′ + (1− λ∗)x′ ∈ ∆({k′, ..., K}) such that mx′′(k′) = e(k′). Then
mx′′(k) = e(k) for all k = k
′, ..., K − 1.
Carrying this inductive process through until k′ = 1, by equation A.5 we find x∗ ∈
∆(Ω′) with, for all y ∈ Mx∗(1) and k = 1, ..., K − 1: rk(β(x∗, y)) = e(k). Hence for all
y ∈Mx∗(1), β(x∗, y) = β¯. Meanwhile for all y 6∈Mx∗(1), there exists 1 ≤ k′ ≤ K − 1 such
that rk(β(x
∗, y)) = e(k) for all k > k′ and rk′(β(x∗), y) > e(k′); this implies (by definition
of e(k′)) that β(x∗, y) 6∈ cl(A).
The following result follows from Lemma A.3 almost immediately.
Lemma A.4. Suppose cl(A) ∩∆(Ω′′) = ∅ for all Ω′′ ( Ω′. Then there exists x ∈ ∆(Ω′)
and β′ ∈ A such that for all y ∈ Z either: (1) β(x, y) 6∈ cl(A) or (2) β(x, y) = β′.
Proof. Find x∗ and β¯ as per Lemma A.3. If β¯ ∈ A then set x = x∗ and β′ = β¯ and we’re
done.
Assume now β¯ 6∈ A. As Z finite, cl(A) is closed, and β(x, y) is continuous in x for
all y ∈ Z, there exists  > 0 and a set N = {x ∈ ∆(Ω′) : |x − x∗| < } such that for all
x ∈ N and y ∈ Z, β(x∗, y) 6∈ cl(A) =⇒ β(x, y) 6∈ cl(A).
By equation A.2, for any γ ∈ ∆(Ω′) and y ∈ Z there exists x ∈ ∆(Ω′) such that
β(x, y) = γ. Also by equation A.2, if β(x, y) = β(x, y′) for some x ∈ ∆int(Ω′) and
y, y′ ∈ Z, then β(x′, y) = β(x′, y′) for all x′ ∈ ∆int(Ω′).
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As β¯ ∈ cl(A), there is a sequence of beliefs in A converging to β¯. By continuity of
β(x, y) in x for all y ∈ Z and the facts in the previous paragraph, there exists β′ ∈ A
close to β¯ and x ∈ N such that for all y ∈ Z, β(x∗, y) = β¯ =⇒ β(x, y) = β′.
Hence we have either β(x, y) = β′ ∈ A or β(x, y) 6∈ cl(A) for all y ∈ Z.
This next Lemma wraps up the proof of the ‘if’ direction of Proposition 2 for the
case that cl(A) ∩∆(Ω′′) = ∅ for all Ω′′ ( Ω′:
Lemma A.5. Suppose cl(A) ∩∆(Ω′′) = ∅ for all Ω′′ ( Ω′. Then there exists a sender j
and x ∈ ∆int(Ω′) with E[uj(β(x,Γ))] > 0.
Proof. Find β′ and x as per Lemma A.4.
Note that for all y ∈ supp[Γ] \Z, one of the following holds. (1) yl = 0 for all l ∈ Ω′.
(2) yl = 0 for some l ∈ Ω′ but yk > 0 for some k ∈ Ω′. For y in case (1), by Claim A.1
p(y|x) = 0. For y in case (2), equation A.2 implies β(x, y) ∈ Ω′′ for some Ω′′ ( Ω′; as Ω′
is minimal we have ui(β(x, y)) = 0 for all i.
For all y ∈ Z such that β(x, y) 6= β′, ui(β(x, y)) = 0 for all i.
Let j be some sender with uj(β
′) > 0. Then E[uj(β(x,Γ))] = uj(β′)Pr(Γ ∈ {y ∈ Z :
β(x, y) = β′}|x) > 0.
Case 2: cl(A) ∩ Ω′′ 6= ∅ for some Ω′′ ( Ω′.
Note that it is still the case that Ω′ is minimal, so A ∩ Ω′′ = ∅ for all Ω′′ ( Ω′.
Let Ω′′ ∈ argmin{Ω′′′⊂Ω′:cl(A)∩Ω′′′ 6=∅}|Ω′′′| be one of the smallest subsets of Ω′ that
intersects cl(A). Note that 1 ≤ |Ω′′| < |Ω′|. Define Z, and all other necessary objects, as
in the previous case. Then note that cl(A) ∩Θ = ∅ for all Θ ( Ω′′ and so by an identical
argument to Lemma A.3 we can find β¯ ∈ cl(A) ∩∆int(Ω′′) and x∗ ∈ ∆int(Ω′′) such that
for all y ∈ Z either β(x∗, y) = β¯ or β(x∗, y) 6∈ cl(A). Then by a similar argument to
Lemma A.4, we can find x ∈ ∆int(Ω′) close to x∗ and β′ ∈ A close to β¯ such that either
β(x, y) = β′ or β(x, y) 6∈ cl(A) for all y ∈ Z.
Following the same argument as in Lemma A.5, all y ∈ supp[Γ] \Z either occur with
30
probability 0 conditional on x or result in a posterior outside of ∆int(Ω′) conditional on
x (yielding 0 utility by minimality of Ω′). Letting j be some sender with uj(β′) > 0, we
have E[uj(β(x,Γ))] > 0 and we’re done.
A.3.3 Additional Claim
In the proof of Proposition 2 given, when utilities are nonlinear on some ∆(Ω′) and
(Γ1, ...,ΓM) pooled Ω
′, we were able to find a sender j who could take advantage of Ω′
being pooled and find x conditonal on which she gets strictly positive expected utility.
Identifying this sender j did not depend on the strategy profile (Γ1, ...,ΓM). Hence, the
claim below (which is useful for further results in Supplementary Appendix B) holds.
Claim A.7. Suppose for some sender i and Ω′ ⊆ Ω that ui is nonlinear on ∆(Ω′). Then
there exists a sender j such that for any (Γ1, ...,ΓM) that pools Ω
′ j can find some x such
that E[uj(β(x,Γ1, ...,ΓM))] > 0.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1.
Proof. ‘If’ direction. Proposition 2 implies that if for every l, k some ui is nonlinear on
∆({l, k}), then in any equilibrium (Γ1, ...,ΓM), w.p. 1 βn(Γ1, ...,ΓM) > 0 for only one
n ∈ Ω. Hence w.p. 1 we must have βn(Γ1, ...,ΓM) = 1 for some n ∈ Ω; the state is fully
revealed.
‘Only if’ direction. Suppose for some l, k ∈ Ω, ui is linear along ∆({l, k}) for all i.
Then the equilibrium construction in the Proposition 2 ‘only if’ direction is a non-fully
revealing equilibrium.
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B Supplementary Appendix B: Extensions
B.1 Single Receiver with Finite Actions
Setup. There is a single receiver. Let A = {a1, ..., aA} be a finite set of actions; the game
is as in the baseline model except after observing realizations of Γ1, ...,ΓM the receiver
picks an action a ∈ A after which the players get payoffs. The reciever’s utility function
is ur : A × Ω → R and senders’ utility functions are ui : A × Ω → R for i = 1, ...,M .
Sender’s preferences are zero-sum: for all a ∈ A, ω ∈ Ω, ∑Mi=1 ui(a, ω) = 0. We make the
assumption that for any a 6= a′ ∈ A, ω ∈ Ω, ur(a, ω) 6= ur(a′, ω) and ui(a, ω) 6= ui(a′, ω)
for all i ∈ {1, ...,M}; this is generically true. The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE).
For any β ∈ ∆(Ω) let A∗(β) = argmaxa∈A
∑N
l=1 ur(a, l)βl. In any PBE, after signals
are realized and the receiver updates to posterior belief β ∈ ∆(Ω), the receiver takes an
action a ∈ A∗(β) that maximizes expected utility (sequential rationality). Let Rindiff =
{β ∈ ∆(Ω) : |A∗(β)| > 1} be the set of posteriors at which the receiver is indifferent
between multiple best actions. We assume that at posteriors in β ∈ Rindiff the receiver
breaks ties by choosing the lowest indexed action in A∗(β). Hence in equilibrium the
reciever takes action a∗(β) = argminab∈A∗(β) b; this is well defined and single valued for
each β ∈ ∆(Ω).
For i = 1, ...,M define vi : ∆(Ω)→ R as sender i’s expected utility from any posterior
β ∈ ∆(Ω) in a PBE following the specified tie breaking rule: vi(β) =
∑N
l=1 ui(a
∗(β), l)βl.
First we show that in any PBE satisfying this tie-breaking rule, vi’s are zero-sum and
piecewise analytic. This will allow us to directly apply our previous results to them.
Claim B.1. In any PBE in which the receiver chooses action a∗(β) = argminab∈A∗(β) b
after signals are realized, v1, ..., vM are each piecewise analytic and are zero-sum.
Proof. Zero-sumness is trivial. For all β,
∑M
i=1 vi(β) =
∑
i
∑N
l=1 ui(a
∗(β), l)βl
=
∑N
l=1 βl
∑
i ui(a
∗(β), l) = 0.
Now we show piecewise analyicity. For each ab ∈ A, let ∆ab = {β ∈ ∆(Ω) : ab =
a∗(β)}. Note that for every ab ∈ A the set ∆ab is convex; for any β, β′ ∈ ∆ab we can see
a∗(λβ + (1− λ)β′) = ab for all λ ∈ (0, 1) as follows. For any b′ < b we have:
32
N∑
l=1
ur(ab, l)βl >
N∑
l=1
ur(ab′ , l)βl
N∑
l=1
ur(ab, l)β
′
l >
N∑
l=1
ur(ab′ , l)β
′
l
=⇒
N∑
l=1
ur(ab, l)(λβl + (1− λ)β′l) >
N∑
l=1
ur(ab′ , l)(λβl + (1− λ)β′l)
For any b′ > b the first two inequalities must hold weakly which implies the third
holds weakly. So at (λβl + (1− λ)β′l) ab yields weakly higher utility for the receiver than
all higher indexed actions. Together this implies a∗(λβ+ (1−λ)β′) = ab and hence ∆ab is
convex. Note that {∆ab}b=1,...,A partition ∆(Ω); hence they form a partition of ∆(Ω) into
convex sets. On each ∆ab , each vi =
∑N
l=1 ui(ab, l)βl (i = 1, ...,M) is linear in β. Hence
each vi is piecewise linear on ∆(Ω). So {vi}i=1,...,M are piecewise analytic.
Lemma B.1 below shows that all vi’s are linear on ∆(Ω
′) if and only if the receiver
prefers the same action at all states in Ω′.
Lemma B.1. Fix Ω′ ⊆ Ω, |Ω′| > 1. v1, ..., vM are all linear on ∆(Ω′) if and only if
a∗(δl) = a∗(δk) for all l, k ∈ Ω′.
Proof. We prove the ‘only if’ direction by proving the contrapositive. Consider any states
l 6= k ∈ Ω′. Suppose a∗(δl) 6= a∗(δk). For β ∈ ∆({l, k}) ⊆ ∆(Ω′), the receiver has
expected utility ur(a, l)βl+ur(a, k)βk. Note by our assumption that no agent is indifferent
between any two actions at any state, we must have that ur(a
∗(δl), l) > ur(a′, l) for all
a′ 6= a∗(δl) and ur(a′, k) < ur(a∗(δk), k) for all a′ 6= a∗(δk). By continuity, this implies
that there exists 1 > βuk > β
l
k > 0 such that for β ∈ ∆({l, k}) if: (1) βk < βlk then
a∗(β) = a∗(δl) and (2) βk > βuk then a
∗(β) = a∗(δk). For β ∈ ∆({l, k}) and i ∈ {1, ...,M},
vi(β) = βkui(a
∗(β), k) + (1−βk)ui(a∗(β), l) = ui(a∗(β), l) +βk(ui(a∗(β), k)−ui(a∗(β), l)).
When βk > β
u
k , vi is linear in βk with slope (ui(a
∗(δk), k)−ui(a∗(δk), l)). When βk < βlk, vi
is linear in βk with slope (ui(a
∗(δl), k)− ui(a∗(δl), l)). These slopes are different because:
ui(a
∗(δk), k)− ui(a∗(δl), k) > 0 > ui(a∗(δk), l)− ui(a∗(δl), l)
=⇒ ui(a∗(δk), k)− ui(a∗(δk), l) 6= ui(a∗(δl), k)− ui(a∗(δl), l)
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Hence vi is nonlinear along ∆({l, k}) and hence nonlinear on ∆(Ω′) ⊇ ∆({l, k}).
‘If’ direction. Suppose for all l ∈ Ω′, a∗(δl) = a. Note that ∆(Ω′) is the convex hull
of {δl : l ∈ Ω′}. Then, by convexity of the set ∆a (see proof of Claim B.1), we must have
∆(Ω′) ⊆ ∆a. For all i ∈ {1, ...,M} vi is linear on ∆a (proof of Claim B.1) and hence
∆(Ω′).
Finally we prove our main results for the finite action model. Proposition B.1 is
important as it says that even when the receiver does not fully learn the state, they learn
adequately —that is, enough that further learning would not influence their action.
Proposition B.1. In any PBE in which the receiver chooses action a∗(β) = argminab∈A∗(β)
b, the receiver takes their first best action w.p. 1.
Proof. Fix a PBE and consider all posteriors induced by the equilibrium experiments with
positive probability. At any posterior β ∈ {δ1, ..., δN}, the receiver clearly takes their first
best action. Now consider any posterior that occurs with positive probability that does
not fully reveal the state. At such a β, there exists Ω′ ⊆ Ω with |Ω′| > 1 and βl > 0 for
all l ∈ Ω′. But then Ω′ is being pooled in equilibrium which implies (Proposition 2) that
v1, ..., vM are all linear on ∆(Ω
′) which implies (Lemma B.1) that there exists a ∈ A such
that a∗(δl) = a for all l ∈ Ω′. Note that ω ∈ Ω′ (all other states are ruled out by β). By
convexity of ∆a (proof of Claim B.1), a
∗(β) = a = a∗(δω). Hence, the receiver’s ex-post
payoff is always their first best payoff: ur(a
∗(ω), ω).
The finite action characterization of all equilibria being fully revealing follows imme-
diately from Theorem 1 and Lemma B.1.
Corollary B.1. The state is fully revealed in every PBE in which the receiver chooses
action a∗(β) = argminab∈A∗(β) b if and only if for every pair of states l and k a
∗(δl) 6=
a∗(δk).
Proof. ‘If’ direction. If for a pair of states l and k, a∗(δl) 6= a∗(δk), then by Lemma B.1
some vi is nonlinear (and hence nonlinear) on ∆({l, k}). If this is true for every pair of
states, then along every edge of the simplex we have nonlinearity of some sender’s utility
function which implies (Theorem 1) full revelation in every equilibrium.
‘Only if’ direction. If a∗(δl) = a∗(δk) for any pair of states l and k, then Lemma
B.1 implies that all vi’s are linear on ∆({l, k}). This implies (Theorem 1) that there are
non-fully revealing equilibria.
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B.2 Robustness
Here we consider the robustness of our results to the assumption that preferences are
zero-sum. Consider a game identical to the baseline model but with utility functions
u1, ..., uM (ui : ∆(Ω) → R) that need not be zero-sum. We assume that all utilities are
piecewise analytic and make the normalization ui(δl) = 0 for all senders i and states l.
We adopt notation from the baseline model whenever it obviously carries over.
Before presenting the robustness results, which concern the information revealed in
equilibrium as preferenes approach zero-sum, we discuss what we can say in this more
general setting. As in the baseline model, we have no issues with equilibrium existence;
for any u1, ...uM there is a fully revealing equilibrium (Γ
FR, ...,ΓFR).20
Of course our results in the paper, starting with Lemma 1, rely on the zero-sumness
of preferences and do not generalize to this setting. While Lemma 1 says senders must
get their full revelation payoff in every equilibrium of a zero-sum game, this is no longer
true when preferences may be nonzero-sum. As an example, suppose all senders have the
same preferences; then there will be an equilibrium in which one sender plays a single
sender optimal experiment (a Bayesian Persuasion, or BP, solution) and all others play
ΓU . This BP solution may not fully reveal the state and may yield the senders strictly
larger payoffs than the 0 payoff from full revelation.21 More generally, when preferences
are not zero-sum, agreement between senders (even if it isn’t complete agreement) may
allow them to play experiments that yield them strictly positive payoffs in equilibrium.
For any γ ∈ ∆(Ω) and u1, ..., uM , let
∑
i ui(γ) be the total surplus shared among
senders when the receiver’s posterior is γ. Note this surplus is 0 when γ ∈ {δ1, ..., δN}.
Let MS(u1, ..., uM) = supγ∈∆(Ω)
∑M
i=1 ui(γ) be the supremum of the total surplus senders
get at any posterior. Note MS(u1, ..., uM) = 0 when the game is zero-sum. While we
cannot pin down equilibrium payoffs as we did in Lemma 1, we can upperbound them for
each sender. While senders may get above utility 0 in equilibrium, none can attain utility
higher than the maximum surplus:
Lemma B.2. In any equilibrium (Γ1, ...,ΓM), for all senders i = 1, ...,M : 0 ≤ Ui(Γ1, ...,ΓM) ≤
MS(u1, ..., uM).
20The reason this is an equilibrium is the same —no sender’s experiment is pivotal when others are
full revealing the state.
21In fact whenever there exists a posterior γ′ that yields the senders utility larger than 0, then all BP
solutions yield utility larger than 0. To see this, note that there exists an experiment that puts support
only on γ′ and δ1, ..., δN (such a construction is shown in the proof of Lemma 1). This experiment yields
all senders utility strictly greater than 0.
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Proof. The first inequality, 0 ≤ Ui(Γ1, ...,ΓM), follows from the fact that each sender can
always fully reveal the state and obtain payoff 0.
Note that for all strategy profiles (Γ′1, ...,Γ
′
M) (with distributions p
′
1, ..., p
′
M), we have:∑
i Ui(Γ1, ...,ΓM) =
∑
i Ep′1,...,p′M [ui(β(Γ1, ...,ΓM))] = Ep′1,...,p′M [
∑
i ui(β(Γ1, ...,ΓM))] ≤
Ep′1,...,p′M [MS(u1, ..., uM)] = MS(u1, ..., uM).
Suppose for contradiction that for equilibrium (Γ1, ...,ΓM) and sender i, Ui(Γ1, ...,ΓM) >
MS(u1, ..., uM). Then the previous paragraph implies that there exists sender j with
Uj(Γ1, ...,ΓM) < 0. But then j can profitably deviate to Γj = Γ
FR. Contradiction.
Lemma B.2 implies that when MS(u1, ..., uM) = 0, all senders get payoff 0 in ev-
ery equilibrium. In one special case, when only fully revealing posteriors generate this
maximum surplus, all equilibria must be fully revealing:
Corollary B.2. If for all γ′ 6∈ {δ1, ..., δM}
∑
i ui(γ
′) < 0, then the state is fully revealed
in every equilibrium.
Proof. Note that MS(u1, ..., uM) = 0. For any strategy profile (Γ1, ...,ΓM) that is fully re-
vealing, Ui(Γ1, ...,ΓM) = 0 for all i. For (Γ1, ...,ΓM) that is not fully revealing,
∑
i Ui(Γ1, ...,ΓM) <
0, as with strictly positive probability the surplus at the posterior is strictly less than 0
(when the state is not fully revealed). This implies that for each non-fully revealing
(Γ1, ...,ΓM), there is a sender j such that Uj(Γ1, ...,ΓM) < 0. Hence, by Lemma B.2, the
state is fully revealed in equilibrium.
The logic of Corollary B.2 is similar to that of Proposition 1 of Gentzkow and Ka-
menica (2016). If sender surplus is uniquely maximized at fully revealing posteriors, any
non-fully revealing strategy profile leaves at least one sender strictly worse off than full
revelation, which is always an available strategy.
We now turn our attention to what we can say as preferences approach zero-sum.
We consider convergence of utilities under the sup norm. A sequence of utility functions
{uk}∞k=1 converges to a function u, or uk → u, if limk→∞ supγ∈∆(Ω) |uk(γ)−u(γ)| = 0. For
a sequence of profiles of utility functions {(uk1, ..., ukM)}∞k=1 (for notational convenience we
will drop the limits), (uk1, ..., u
k
M)→ (u1, ..., uM) if uki → ui for i = 1, ...,M .
For a sequence of strategies/experiments {Γk}∞k=1, with each Γk distributed according
to pmf pk, we say Γk → Γ (where Γ has distribution p), or Γk converges in distribution to
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Γ, if for all γ ∈ ∆(Ω), limk→∞ pk(γ) = p(γ). For any strategy profile (Γ1, ...,ΓM), let the
random variable Γ(Γ1, ...,ΓM) denote the receiver’s posterior after observing realizations
of all Γ1, ...,ΓM (i.e. the experiment induced by combining all M senders’ experiments).
The following result says that as utilities converge to zero-sum sufficiently nonlinear
functions, the information revealed along any sequence of equilibria, whenever convergent,
converges to full revelation.
Proposition B.2. Fix a sequence of games with utilities {(uk1, ..., ukM)} with (uk1, ..., ukM)→
(u1, ..., uM) and
∑
i ui(γ) = 0 for all γ ∈ ∆(Ω). For each k let (Γk1, ...,ΓkM) be an equilib-
rium of game (uk1, ..., u
k
M). Suppose for every pair of states l, k ∈ Ω there exists an i with
ui nonlinear on ∆({l, k}). Then if Γ(Γk1, ...,ΓkM)→ Γ, Γ = ΓFR.
Proposition B.2 is important, as indicates that Theorem 1 does not qualitatively rely
on the knife-edge assumption of zero-sum preferences. As utilities get close to zero-sum
and sufficiently nonlinear, the information revealed in every equilibrium (if it converges)
gets close to full revelation. Before proving the result, we prove a lemma which shows
Proposition 2 is similarly robust.
Lemma B.3. Fix a sequence of games with utilities {(uk1, ..., ukM)} with (uk1, ..., ukM) →
(u1, ..., uM) and
∑
i ui(γ) = 0 for all γ ∈ ∆(Ω). For each k let (Γk1, ...,ΓkM) be an equilib-
rium for (uk1, ..., u
k
M). Suppose for some Ω
′ ⊆ Ω and i, ui is nonlinear on ∆(Ω′). Then if
Γ(Γk1, ...,Γ
k
M)→ Γ, Γ does not pool Ω′.
Proof. For strategy profile (Γ′1, ...,Γ
′
M) (with distributions p
′
1, ..., p
′
M), let U
k
i (Γ
′
1, ...,Γ
′
M) =
Ep′1,...,p′M [u
k
i (β)] be sender i’s expected utility when she has preferences u
k
i .
Let the distribution of Γ be p and for any k let the distribution of Γ(Γk1, ...,Γ
k
M) be p
k.
Note that as Γ(Γk1, ...,Γ
k
M) has finite support for every k, Γ must also finite support (by the
definition of convergence in distribution). Define T = supp[Γ]∪ (∪∞k=1supp[Γ(Γk1, ...ΓkM)]);
note by the finiteness of all terms in the union, T is countable.
Suppose for contradiction that some ui is nonlinear on Ω
′ and Γ pools Ω′. By Claim
A.7, there exists a sender j such who can find experiment Γj (with distribution pj) such
that in the limiting (zero-sum) game (u1, ..., uM), Uj(Γj,Γ) = c > 0.
For any k, MS(uk1, ..., u
k
M) = supγ
∑
i u
k
i (γ) = supγ
∑
i ui(γ) + (u
k
i (γ) − ui(γ)) ≤
supγ
∑
i ui(γ) + |uki (γ) − ui(γ)|. As (uk1, ..., ukM) → (u1, ..., uM), the second term goes to
0 for all i as k → ∞ and hence MS(uk1, ..., ukM) → MS(u1, ..., uM) = 0. This implies
37
there exists K s.t. ∀k > K, MS(uk1, ..., ukM) < c/2. By Lemma B.2, for all k > K,
Ukj (Γ
k
j ,Γ
k
−j) < c/2.
Consider j playing experiment Γkj as well as (conditionally independently) playing
Γj, while her opponents’ play Γ
k
−j. The expected payoff that j gets from this can be
written Ukj (Γ(Γj,Γ
k
j ),Γ
k
−j) = U
k
j (Γj,Γ(Γ
k
1, ...,Γ
k
M)), as it does not affect j’s payoff if she
plays Γkj or her opponents’ do. As T ⊃ supp[Γ(Γk1, ...,ΓkM)] for each k, we can write
Ukj (Γj,Γ(Γ
k
1, ...,Γ
k
M)) =
∑
x∈supp[Γj ]
∑
y∈supp[T ] u
k
j (β(x, y))p
k(y|x)pj(x). Then:
lim
k→∞
Ukj (Γj,Γ(Γ
k
1, ...,Γ
k
M)) =
∑
x∈supp[Γj ]
∑
y∈supp[T ]
lim
k→∞
ukj (β(x, y))p
k(y|x)pj(x)
For any y ∈ T , limk→∞ ukj (β(x, y)) = uj(β(x, y)) and limk→∞ pk(y|x) = p(y|x) (by
definition of pk(y|x) and convergence in distribution). Hence:
lim
k→∞
Ukj (Γj,Γ(Γ
k
1, ...,Γ
k
M)) =
∑
x∈supp[Γj ]
∑
y∈supp[T ]
uj(β(x, y))p(y|x)pj(x) = Uj(Γj,Γ) = c
This implies that there exists K ′ such that ∀k > K ′, Ukj (Γj,Γ(Γk1, ...,ΓkM)) > c/2.
TakeK ′′ = max{K,K ′}. For all k > K ′′ we have: Ukj (Γkj ,Γk−j) < c/2 and Ukj (Γj,Γ(Γk1, ...,ΓkM)) >
c/2. But for all k > K ′′, this contradicts that (Γk1, ...,Γ
k
M) is an equilibrium as j has a
profitable deviation of Γ(Γj,Γ
k
j ).
We now prove Proposition B.2.
Proof. Suppose not. Then Γ(Γk1, ...,Γ
k
M)→ Γ 6= ΓFR. Then Γ pools some set of states Ω′
with |Ω′| ≥ 2; let l, k ∈ Ω′. There is a sender with ui nonlinear on ∆({l, k}); hence ui is
nonlinear on ∆(Ω′). But then by Lemma B.3 Γ must not pool Ω′. Contradiction.
Proposition 4 relates to the standard results on the upper hemicontinuity of the set
of equilibria (although here we are not concerned with the set of equilibrium actions
themselves but instead the set of information that could be revealed in equilibrium). As
is also standard, we do not have the corresponding lower hemicontinuity properties. In
particular, it is possible for there to be non-fully revealing equilibria in the limit, but only
fully revealing equilibria along the sequence. It is not hard to come up with examples of
this; we provide a one here.
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Example 1. Suppose Ω = {0, 1} and there are two senders 1 and 2. Consider the sequence
of utility functions {(uk1, uk2)} with uk1(β) = −1k for all β ∈ [0, 1]\{0, 1}, uk1(0) = uk1(1) = 0,
and u2(β) = 0 for all β ∈ [0, 1]. Define utility function u as u(β) = 0 for all β. Then
note (uk1, u
k
2) → (u, u). Proposition 1 states that in the game (u, u), there are non-fully
revealing equilibria (any strategy profile is an equilibrium). Note for any k, the game
(uk1, u
k
2), u
k
1(β) + u
k
2(β) < 0 for all β 6∈ {0, 1}. Hence by Corollary B.2, all equilibria of
(uk1, u
k
2) are fully revealing for all k.
B.3 Infinite Signal Experiments
So far we have restricted senders to choosing experiments with a finite number of signals,
or equivalently interim belief distributions pi ∈ P that have finite support. In this section
we demonstrate that our takeaway from the finite signal results —that for typical sender
preferences we have full revelation in every equilibrium —extends when senders can choose
from a more general set of experiments. Senders now choose any experiments Π : Ω →
∆(S) (with no restrictions on the signal space). Again, we recast choices of experiments as
choices of interim belief distributions. For technical convenience we restrict our attention
to senders choosing interim belief distributions that can be written as the sum of absolutely
continuous and discrete distributions.22 We will call the space of pure strategies, or the
set of Bayes-plausible distributions that satisfies this requirement G. Formally G = {g ∈
∆(∆(Ω)) : Eg[Γi] = pi, g = gc + gd for some abs. cont. and discrete (respectively)
measures gc, gd ∈ ∆(∆(Ω))}. Each g ∈ G is a generalized density.23 A strategy for sender
i is a choice of random variable Γi with generalized density gi ∈ G. Preferences over
strategy profiles for a sender i are given by Ui(Γ1, ...,ΓM) = Eg1,...,gM [ui(β)]. The game
and equilibrium concept are otherwise identical to the finite signal model (including our
normalization of the ui’s).
Remark: Note that our equilibrium analysis under both the finite signal restriction
and under the technical restriction above can be seen as equilibrium selections. Any finite
signal equilibrium will also be an equilibrium when senders are allowed to pick strategies
from G and any equilibria with strategies selected from G will be equilibria in a game
where senders can pick any distribution in ∆(∆(Ω)).
We make one additional technical assumption on utility functions:
22As ∆(Ω) ⊂ RN , by the Lebesgue Decomposition Theorem this only rules senders choosing distribu-
tions with singular continuous components.
23g is the density function gc on intervals where the distribution is absolutely continuous and the
probability mass function gd everywhere else.
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Assumption B.1. For each l ∈ Ω and i ∈ {1, ...,M}, ui is real analytic in some neigh-
borhood of δl.
Note that Assumption B.1 only rules out piecewise analytic utility functions for which
some δl lies on the boundary between different pieces. For any states l, k let v
l,k ∈ RN be
the vector from δl to δk.
24 For any sender i let ∇vl,kui(·) be the directional derivative of
ui moving along v
l,k. Note for some i ∇vl,kui(·) may not be well defined at some points
on ∆(Ω); but under Assumption 7.1 for all i and all l it is a well defined continuous
function in some neighborhood of δl. With this assumption we can define Condition B.1.
Condition B.1 concerns the shape of utility functions on an edge of the simplex and will
be sufficient for a pair of states l and k to not be pooled in every equilibrium.
Definition B.1. For any states l, k and sender i we say that ui satisfies Condition B.1
on ∆({l, k}) if either ∇vl,kui(δl) 6= ui(δk)− ui(δl), ∇vl,kui(δk) 6= ui(δk)− ui(δl), or both.25
For example, utility functions that look like Figure 7.2 along edge ∆({l, k}) do not
satisfy Condition B.1; nor does a utility function that is linear along that edge. Functions
that look this those in Figure 1 do satisfy Condition B.1.
Figure B.3
Proposition B.3.1. For any pair of states l and k, if there exists a sender i with ui
satisfying Condition B.1 on ∆({l, k}), then l and k are not pooled in every equilibrium.
24vl,kk = 1, v
l,k
l = −1, vl,kn = 0 for all n 6= l, k.
25Under the normalization we made, ui(δk)− ui(δl) = 0.
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We prove Proposition B.3.1 after redefining some objects for this setting. For any
sender i and strategy profile for all opponents {Γj}j 6=i, we define Wi(x) for x ∈ ∆(Ω)
analogously to the finite signal case.
Wi(x) =
∫
∆(Ω)
ui(β(x, y))p−i(y|x)dy (B.1)
For any vector v ∈ RN and y ∈ ∆(Ω), let ∇vp−i(y|x) and ∇vβk(x, y) (for any state
k) be the directional derivates of these two functions with respect to x along vector v.
Note the following.
∇vp−i(y|x) = ∇v
N∑
l=1
xlylp−i(y)
pil
=
N∑
l=1
vlylp−i(y)
pil
(B.2)
∇vβk(x, y) = ∇v
xkyk
pik∑N
l=1
xlyl
pil
= −
N∑
l=1
vlyl
pil
xkyk
pik
(
∑N
n=1
xnyn
pin
)2
+
vkyk
pik∑N
l=1 xlyl/pil
(B.3)
For any states l, k ∈ {1, ..., N} let ∆int({l, k}) = ∆({l, k})\{δl, δk} be the nondegen-
erate beliefs in ∆({l, k}). Let ∆0({l, k}) = {β ∈ ∆(Ω) : βl, βk = 0} and ∆1({l, k}) = {β ∈
∆(Ω) : βl+βk < 1; βl and/or βk 6= 0}. Note {δl, δk}∪∆int({l, k})∪∆0({l, k})∪∆1({l, k}) =
∆(Ω) and all four sets are disjoint.
We now prove Proposition B.3.1
Proof. First note Lemma 1 still holds in this context by an identical proof. In any equi-
librium (Γ1, ...,ΓM) all senders i have: Ui(Γ1, ...,ΓM) = 0 and Wi(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ ∆(Ω).
WLOG let l = 1, k = 2. For notational convenience let v = v1,2. Suppose ui
satisfies Condition B.1 on ∆({1, 2}) for some i. WLOG we consider the case ∇vui(δ2) 6=
ui(δ2) − ui(δ1) = 0. Then by zero-sumness (derivatives must also be zero-sum where
they exist for all senders) there exists a sender j with ∇vuj(δ2) = c < 0. We will prove
that Γ−j must not pool {l, k}; this clearly implies the Proposition B.3.1 as by Claim A.3,
(Γ1, ...,ΓM) also will not pool {l, k}.
Suppose for contradiction there is an equilibrium (Γ1, ...,ΓM) such that Γ−j pools
{l, k}. For x ∈ ∆(Ω), by the product rule and the partition of ∆(Ω) into {δ1, δ2},∆int({1, 2}),
∆0({1, 2}),∆1({1, 2}):
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∇vWj(x) = ∇v(uj(β(x, δ2))p−j(δ2|x) + uj(β(x, δ2))∇vp−j(δ2|x)
+∇v(uj(β(x, δ1))p−j(δ1|x) + uj(β(x, δ1))∇vp−j(δ1|x)
+
∫
∆int({1,2})
∇vuj(β(x, y))p−j(y|x)dy +
∫
∆int({1,2})
uj(β(x, y))∇vp−j(y|x)dy
+
∫
∆0({1,2})
∇vuj(β(x, y))p−j(y|x)dy +
∫
∆0({1,2})
uj(β(x, y))∇vp−j(y|x)dy
+
∫
∆1({1,2})
∇vuj(β(x, y))p−j(y|x)dy +
∫
∆1({1,2})
uj(β(x, y))∇vp−j(y|x)dy
though this may not be well defined for some x. Note:
∇v(uj(β(x, y))p−j(δ2|x)) =
N∑
k=1
∂uj(β(x, y))
∂βk
∇vβk(x, y)p−j(y|x)
(again this may not be well defined for some x). Now consider x ∈ ∆({1, 2}). For
such x, with some algebra:
∇vβk(x, y)p−j(y|x) =
(y1/pi1 − y2/pi2)xkykpik
x1y1
pi1
+ x2y2
pi2
+
vkyk
pik
(B.4)
One can check that for y ∈ ∆0({1, 2}) and for y ∈ {δ1, δ2} this expression is 0 for
all k = 1, ..., N . This tells us that the 1st, 3rd, and 7th terms of ∇vWj(x) are 0 for
x ∈ ∆({1, 2}). Note that for y ∈ ∆({1, 2})0, ∇vp−i(y|x) = 0, and so the 8th term is also
0.
We consider the limit of ∇vWj(x) for x ∈ ∆({1, 2}) as x → δ2. We show this limit
exists and is negative.
lim
x→δ2
∇vWj(x) = lim
x→δ2
uj(β(x, δ2))∇vp−j(δ2|x) + lim
x→δ2
uj(β(x, δ1))∇vp−j(δ1|x)
+
∫
∆int({1,2})
N∑
k=1
lim
x→δ2
∂uj(β(x, y))
∂βk
∇vβk(x, y)p−j(y|x)dy +
∫
∆int({1,2})
lim
x→δ2
uj(β(x, y))∇vp−j(y|x)dy
+
∫
∆1({1,2})
N∑
k=1
lim
x→δ2
∂uj(β(x, y))
∂βk
∇vβk(x, y)p−j(y|x)dy +
∫
∆1({1,2})
lim
x→δ2
uj(β(x, y))∇vp−j(y|x)dy
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We evaluate this term by term. The first term is 0 as ∇vp−j(δ2|x) is finite and
does not depend on x and limx→δ2 β(x, δ2) = δ2 which implies (by continuity of uj in a
neighborhood of δ2) limx→δ2 uj(β(x, δ2)) = 0. The second term is also 0 as ∇vp−j(δ1|x)
is finite and does not depend on x and limx→δ2 β(x, δ1) = δ1 (by L’Hopital’s rule) which
implies (by continuity of uj in a neighborhood of δ1) limx→δ2 uj(β(x, δ1)) = 0.
The fourth term is also 0 as for all y ∈ ∆int({1, 2}), limx→δ2 β(x, y) = δ2 and uj(δ2) =
0 while ∇vp−j(y|x) is finite and does not depend on x. The sixth term is also 0 for the
following reason. For y ∈ ∆1({1, 2}) with y2 > 0, limx→δ2 β(x, y) = δ2; as uj(δ2) = 0, the
terms inside the integral are 0 when y2 > 0. For y ∈ ∆1({1, 2}) with y2 = 0, we must
have y1 > 0; then by L’Hopital’s rule limx→δ2 β(x, y) = δ1 and uj(δ1) = 0 meaning terms
inside the interal are 0 when y2 = 0.
Using (B.4) note that ∇vβk(x, y)p−j(y|x) = 0 for all k 6= 1, 2 as for such k xk =
vk = 0. For y ∈ ∆({1, 2})int we have: limx→δ2∇vβ1(x, y)p−j(y|x) = −y1pi1 p−j(y) and
limx→δ2 ∇vβ2(x, y)p−j(y|x) = y1pi1p−j(y). The same holds for y ∈ ∆1({1, 2}) with y2 > 0.
For y ∈ ∆1({1, 2}) with y2 = 0, we have: limx→δ2∇vβ1(x, y)p−j(y|x) = limx→δ2 ∇vβ2(x, y)p−j(y|x) =
0 (applying L’Hopital’s rule).
Putting this together:
lim
x→δ2
∇vWj(x) =
∫
∆int({1,2})∪{y∈∆1({1,2}):y2>0}
[
∂uj(δ2)
∂β2
− ∂uj(δ2)
∂β1
]
y1
pi1
p−j(y)dy
= ∇vuj(δ2)
∫
∆int({1,2})∪{y∈∆1({1,2}):y2>0}
y1
pi1
p−j(y)dy
= c
∫
∆int({1,2})∪{y∈∆1({1,2}):y2>0}
y1
pi1
p−j(y)dy
(B.5)
As Γ−j pools Ω′, there exists y ∈ supp[Γ] for which y1, y2 > 0. Such a y must fall
inside the set (∆int({1, 2}) ∪ {y ∈ ∆1({1, 2}) : y2 > 0}) (any point in the completement
of this set assigns probability 0 to at least one of states 1, 2.). This implies that there are
y ∈ (∆int({1, 2}) ∪ {y ∈ ∆1({1, 2}) : y2 > 0}) for which pj(y) > 0 and y1 > 0. As y′1 ≥ 0
for all y′ ∈ ∆(Ω), the integral on the righthand side of equation B.5 is strictly positive.
As c < 0, we have limx→δ2 ∇vWj(x) < 0.
But as Wj(δ2) = 0, this implies that for some x
∗ ∈ ∆({1, 2}) close enough to δ2, we
must have Wj(x
∗) > 0, contradicting Lemma 1.
Condition B.1 holding on each edge for some sender is a sufficient condition for full
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revelation in any equilibrium.
Theorem B.3.1. If for every pair of states l and k there exists a sender i such that ui
satisfies Condition B.1 on ∆({l, k}) then the state is fully revealed in every equilibrium
in which senders choose experiments from G.
Proof. If for every pair l, k there is a sender with ui satisfying Condition B.1 on ∆({l, k}),
then by Proposition B.3.1, no pair of states is pooled in any equilibrium. Hence w.p. 1
the posterior assigns positive probability to only 1 state and hence must fully reveal that
state.
Note that a function not satisfying Condition B.1 along a given edge is knife-edge
—it requires a particular directional derivative to take a certain value at two points. If
no sender has a utility function satisfying Condition B.1 along an edge, this is even more
particular. Hence we ‘typically’ expect Condition B.1 to be satified on each edge for
some ui and so Theorem B.3.1 says we should typically expect fully revelation in every
equilibrium.
B.4 Privately Informed Senders
Consider our baseline model with one modification: each sender receives a private signal
before the game. For simplicity, senders’ private signals are realizations of finite signal
experiments that are conditionally (on ω) independent across senders.26 We think of the
experiments in terms of the beliefs they induce. Formally each sender i draws a private
belief bi ∈ ∆(Ω) with bi ∼ Bi ∈ P , |supp[bi]| < ∞, and E[bi] = pi (Bayes-plausibility).
The distributions {Bi}Ni=1 are conditionally independent. We make one more assumption:
that for each Ω′ ( Ω, supp[bi] ∩∆(Ω′) = ∅ for all i; no sender’s private information rules
out any states.27
A pure strategy for sender i is a mapping from private beliefs (or types) to choices
of finite signal experiments: σi : supp[bi]→ P . As before, we use Γi to denote the interim
belief produced by sender i’s experiment. i chooses the distribution of Γi, pi ∈ P after
observing her own type. Importantly, we define Γi to be the interim belief the receiver
holds after viewing realization of i’s experiment but without updating her belief on Ω from
observing the choice of pi (we formalize this updating in the next paragraph). Hence Γi is
26These assumptions are not necessary.
27Having already made the assumption of finite signals, this assumption is equivalent saying signals
are bounded.
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the receiver’s learning from i’s experiment ignoring information from signalling. A pure
strategy profile is a vector (σ1, ..., σM).
The receiver’s posterior belief β is a function of the signal realizations she observes
as well as the experiment choices she observes. The receiver will form beliefs about each
{bi}i=1,...,M independently via a belief function µi : ∆(∆(Ω))→ ∆(supp[bi]) (i = 1, ...,M)
which maps choices of experiment to a belief on the sender’s type.28 For an experiment
choice of pi by sender i, let µi(pi)[b] denote the probability the receiver assigns to bi = b
under belief function µi. For i = 1, ...,M let τ i(µi, pi) ∈ ∆(Ω) be the receiver’s belief on
ω given belief function µi after observing experiment choice pi from sender i but not its
signal realization or any other senders’ experiment choices are realizations. Then for each
state l ∈ Ω:
τ il (µ
i, pi) =
∑
b∈supp[bi]
Pr(ω = l|bi = b)Pr(bi = b|pi) =
∑
b∈supp[bi]
blµ
i(pi)[b] (B.6)
For any sender i let αi(Γi, pi, µ
i) ∈ ∆(Ω) be the random variable representing the
receiver’s interim belief given µi after observing just the choice pi and the realization
of Γi. α
i hence captures the receiver’s belief after taking into account all information
—signalling and otherwise —from sender i. For any l ∈ Ω:
αil(Γi, pi, µ
i) =
τ il (µ
i, pi)Γi,l/pil∑N
k=1 τ
i
k(µ
i, pi)Γi,k/pik
(B.7)
For fixed {µi}i=1,...,M , after observing {pi} and realizations {Γi}, the receiver updates
by Bayes rule to a posterior belief for each l ∈ Ω:
βl({Γi}, {pi}, {µi}) = Π
M
i=1α
i
l(Γi, pi, µ
i)/piM−1l∑N
k=1 Π
M
s=1α
i
k(Γi, pi, µ
i)/piM−1k
(B.8)
A PBE (in pure strategies) is a strategy profile (σ1, ..., σM) and a set of belief functions
(µ1, ..., µM) satisfying two conditions. First, no sender i can strictly gain from deviating
from σi(bi) for any bi ∈ supp[bi]:
28While other senders’ experiment choices and the realizations of (Γ1, ...,ΓM ) will affect the receiver’s
belief about each bi, as players’ types and experiment realizations are conditionally independent they
will only affect the receiver’s beliefs through learning about ω. This updating will hence not affect the
receiver’s belief on ω, which is all that players care about. The functions {µi} are what is important for
evaluating senders’ payoffs.
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∀i ∈ {1, ...,M}, bi ∈ supp[bi] : E{Bj}j 6=i [Eσi(bi),{pj}j 6=i [ui(β)]|bi]
≥ E{Bj}j 6=i [Ep′i,{pj}j 6=i [ui(β)]|bi] for all p′i ∈ P
(B.9)
where the receiver’s posterior β is formed using (B.8). It is important to note that
sender i may not know {pj}j 6=i but forms beliefs about these given her own private infor-
mation to evaluate expected utility.
Second, beliefs must follow Bayes rule on path:
∀i ∈ {1, ...,M} and p ∈ P s.t. ∃bi ∈ supp[bi] with σi(bi) = p :
∀b ∈ supp[bi], µi(p)[b] = 1σ(b)=pBi(b)∑
b′∈supp[bi] 1σ(b′)=pBi(b
′)
(B.10)
The result below is Lemma 1 adapted to this setting with private information.
Lemma B.4. Take any equilibrium (σ1, ..., σM), (µ
1, ..., µM). For any sender i and b ∈
supp[bi], conditional on bi = b sender i gets expected utility 0.
Proof. Fix any equilibrium. No sender i can get expected utility strictly less than 0
conditional on any bi = b ∈ supp[bi], as playing the fully revealing experiment guarantees
expected utility 0. This means each sender i’s expected utility unconditional on type,
∑
b′∈supp[bi]
E{Bj}j 6=i [Eσi(b′),{pj}j 6=i [ui(β)]]Bi(b
′) (B.11)
is weakly positive. As the game is zero-sum, the sum of all senders’ unconditional
expected utilities must be 0; as each of these payoffs is weakly positive, it must be Equation
B.11 is equal to 0 for each i. But then as each term in the summation of Equation B.11
is weakly positive, sender i’s expected utility conditional on bi = b cannot be strictly
positive, and hence it must be 0.
We redefine state pooling in the game with private information as follows. An equi-
librium (σ1, ..., σM), (µ
1, ..., µM) does not pool a set of states Ω′ ⊆ Ω if Pr(βl > 0 ∀l ∈
Ω′) = 0. Otherwise, the equilibrium pools Ω′. The following Lemma is useful for the main
results; it says an equilibrium pools Ω′ if and only if αi does for every sender i.
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Lemma B.5. An equilibrium (σ1, ..., σM), (µ
1, ..., µM) pools Ω′ ⊆ Ω if and only if for all
i Pr(αil(Γi, pi, µ
i) > 0 ∀l ∈ Ω′) > 0.
Proof. ‘If’ direction. If for all i Pr(αil(Γi, pi, µ
i) > 0 ∀l ∈ Ω′), then as αi is conditionally
(on state) across senders (as bi and Γi are), Pr(α
i
l(Γi, pi, µ
i) > 0 ∀l ∈ Ω′ ∀i = 1, ...,M) >
0. By equation B.8, Pr(βl > 0 ∀l ∈ Ω′) > 0.
‘Only if’ direction. If for some sender i, Pr(αil(Γi, pi, µ
i) > 0 ∀l ∈ Ω′) = 0, then by
equation B.8, βl = 0 for some l ∈ Ω′ w.p. 1.
We now provide a sufficient condition for a pair of states to be not pooled in every
equilibrium. The sufficient condition is the same as that in Section B.3 and will lead to
the same sufficient condition for full revelation in all equilibria. We note as before that
this condition is satisfied for all but a knife-edge case of sender preferences. As in Section
B.3 we make the mild technical assumption that all sender utilities are real analytic in
some neighborhood of δl for all states l (Assumption B.1).
Lemma B.6. Suppose Assumption B.1 holds. Consider any pair of states l and k. {l, k}
is not pooled in every equilibrium if for some i ui satisfies Condition B.1 on ∆({l, k}).
Proof. WLOG let l = 1, k = 2. For notational convenience let v = v1,2. Suppose ui
satisfies Condition B.1 on ∆({1, 2}) for some i. WLOG we consider the case ∇vui(δ2) 6=
ui(δ2)− ui(δ1) = 0. Then by zero-sumness (derivatives must also be zero-sum where they
exist for all senders) there exists a sender j with ∇vuj(δ2) = c < 0. This implies there
exists r ∈ (0, 1) such that for all γ ∈ ∆({1, 2}) with γ2 > r, uj(γ) > 0. In other words, j
has a region of advantage along ∆({1, 2}) close to δ2.
Suppose for contradiction there is an equilibrium (σ1, ..., σM), (µ
1, ..., µM) that pools
{l, k}. For each j′ 6= j, let Λj′ = αj′(Γj′ , pj′ , µj′). By Lemma B.5, for all j′ 6= j, Λj′
pools {1, 2}. Note Λj′ is also a random variable (where randomness is over pj′ and the
realization of Γj′) with finite support (due to finite support of bj′ and Γj′). If all senders
j′ 6= j follow the equilibrium play, Λj′ is also Bayes-plausible (with mean pi); this is
because Γj′ Bayes-plausible, any learning the receiver does about bj′ must follow Bayes
rule on path, and the distribution of bj′ has mean pi. Let Λ−j denote the interim belief
induced by viewing realizations of all {Λj′}j′ 6=j; note this experiment also pools {1, 2};
this is also a finite signal Bayes-plausible experiment.
We will now find a profitable deviation for sender j. This deviation will take the form
of an experiment p′j, which we will construct, that generates strictly positive expected
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utility no matter what j’s type is.
We can rewrite βl for l ∈ Ω (from equation B.8) conditional on this deviation p′j as:
βl(Λ−j, αj(Γj, p′j, µ
j)) =
Λ−j,lα
j
l (Γj, p
′
j, µ
j)/pil∑N
k=1 Λ−j,kα
j
k(Γj, p
′
j, µ
j)/pik
(B.12)
It is also useful to write down the probability distribution of Λ−j conditional on
αj(Γj, p
′
j, µ
j):
Pr(Λ−j = y|αj(Γj, p′j, µj)) =
N∑
l=1
αjl (Γj, p
′
j, µ
j)yl
pil
(B.13)
Let Y = {y ∈ supp[Λ−j] : y1, y2 > 0}; note this set is nonempty as Λ−j pools {1, 2}.
Let Y0 = {y ∈ supp[Λ−j] : y1, y2 = 0}, Y1 = {y ∈ supp[Λ−j] : y1 > 0, y2 = 0}, and
Y2 = {y ∈ supp[Λ−j] : y1 = 0, y2 > 0}. These sets partition the support of Λ−j.
Consider j generating interim belief Γj = x ∈ ∆({1, 2}) \ {δ1, δ2}. As in Proposition
2’s proof, we will try and find such an x conditional on which j gets a strictly positive
expected payoff. We will then construct p′j which assigns positive probability to x. Note
that Pr(αj(Γj, p
′
j, µ
j) ∈ ∆({l, k}) \ {δ1, δ2}|Γj = x) = 1. This can be seen from the
definition of αj (equation B.7) and is a consequence of every private belief b ∈ supp[bj]
having bn > 0 for all n ∈ Ω which implies τ jl (µj, p′j) > 0 for all l ∈ Ω. This implies
that Pr(Λ−j ∈ Y0|Γj = x ∈ ∆({1, 2}) \ {δ1, δ2}) = 0 (equation B.13). Also note that
conditional on Γj = x ∈ ∆({1, 2}) \ {δ1, δ2}, β = δ1 when Λ−j ∈ Y1 and β = δ2 when
Λ−j ∈ Y2 (see equation B.12); these posteriors both yield utility 0.
Finally, note that conditional Γj = x ∈ ∆({1, 2}) \ {δ1, δ2}, we have Pr(Λ−j ∈
Y ) > 0 (by equation B.13 and αj ∈ ∆({l, k}) \ {δ1, δ2}). Note that for each y ∈ Y
and αj(Γj, p
′
j, µ
j) ∈ ∆({1, 2})\{δ1, δ2}, βk(y, αj(Γj, p′j, µj)) is continuous in αj(Γj, p′j, µj),
βk(y, α
j(Γj, p
′
j, µ
j))→ 1 as αj(Γj, p′j, µj)→ 1, and βk(y, αj(Γj, p′j, µj))→ 0 as αj(Γj, p′j, µj)→
0. As Y is finite, the function miny∈Y βk(y, αj(Γj, p′j, µ
j)) is also continuous in its second
argument for αj(Γj, p
′
j, µ
j) ∈ ∆({1, 2})\{δ1, δ2} and goes to 0 or 1 as αj(Γj, p′j, µj) goes to
0 or 1 respectively. By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a αr ∈ (0, 1) such that
miny∈Y βk(y, αr) = r. When 1 > αj(Γj, p′j, µ
j) > αr, we have βk(y, α
j(Γj, p
′
j, µ
j)) ∈ (r, 1)
for all y ∈ Y .
Note that for Γj = x ∈ ∆({1, 2})\{δ1, δ2}, we have αj2(x, p′j, µj) =
τ j2 (µ
j ,p′j)x2/pi2
τ j1 (µ
j ,p′j)x1/pi1+τ
j
2 (µ
j ,p′j)x2/pi2
.
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We can rewrite this as: αj2(x, p
′
j, µ
j) =
τ
j
2(µ
j,p′j)
τ
j
1(µ
j,p′
j
)
x2/pi2
x1/pi1+
τ
j
2(µ
j,p′
j
)
τ
j
1(µ
j,p′
j
)
x2/pi2
. Note that as private beliefs have
finite support and cannot rule out any state, for all beliefs the receiver may hold about j’s
type, µ ∈ ∆(supp[bj]), the corresponding belief τ this induces on Ω (τl =
∑
b∈supp[bj ])blµ[b])
must have τ2
τ1
≥ d > 0 for some d ∈ (0, 1). Hence:
αj2(x, p
′
j, µ
j) =
τ j2 (µ
j ,p′j)
τ j1 (µ
j ,p′j)
x2/pi2
x1/pi1 +
τ j2 (µ
j ,p′j)
τ j1 (µ
j ,p′j)
x2/pi2
≥ dx2/pi2
x1/pi1 + dx2/pi2
(B.14)
αj2(x, p
′
j, µ
j) is continuous in x on ∆({1, 2}) \ {δ1, δ2} and will also fall in ∆({1, 2}) \
{δ1, δ2}. By equation B.14, as x2 → 1, αj2(x, p′j, µj) → 1 regardless of what beliefs the
receiver holds. Hence there exist x∗ ∈ ∆({1, 2})\{δ1, δ2} such that 1 > αj2(x∗, p′j, µj) > αr.
Hence we have βk(y, α
j(x∗, p′j, µ
j)) ∈ (r, 1) for all y ∈ Y . Conditional on x∗, j gets
expected utility:
∑
y∈Y1
uj(δ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Pr(Λ−j = y|αj(x∗, p′j, µj)) +
∑
y∈Y2
uj(δ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
Pr(Λ−j = y|αj(x∗, p′j, µj))
+
∑
y∈Y
uj(β(y, α
j(x∗, p′j, µ
j)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
Pr(Λ−j = y|αj(x∗, p′j, µj))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0
The proof of Lemma 1 demonstrates how any type of sender j can construct a stratgy
p′j which assigns positive probability only to x
∗ and {δ1, ..., δN}. p′j yields j strictly positive
expected utility conditional on x∗ being realized and 0 utility otherwise. Hence Lemma
B.4 is violated. Contradiction. Hence no equilibrium can pool {1, 2}.
Lemma B.6 implies that Condition B.1 being satisfied by some ui on each edge of
the simplex is sufficient for full revelation in all equilibria. It is worth noting again that
is sufficient condition is satisfied for all but a knife-edge case of sender preferences.
Proposition B.3. Suppose Assumption B.1 holds. The state is fully revealed in every
equilibrium if for all pairs of states l and k, there is some ui that satisfies Condition B.1
on ∆({l, k}).
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Proof. Argument is identical to Theorem B.3.1’s proof.
B.5 Sequential Moving Senders
Consider a sequential version of our baseline model. Senders 1, ...,M move in order,
observing all previous experiment choices (but not realizations); we are interested in pure
strategy subgame perfect Nash Equilibria (henceworth just SPNE) of this game. Note
that for a simultaneous game, there are multiple corresponding sequential games, one for
each ordering of senders.
A few facts easily carry over from the simultaneous case. First, all senders must get
utility 0 in equilibrium (as the game is zero-sum and anyone can fully reveal the state).
Second, full revelation can be supported as an SPNE outcome in a game with senders
moving in any order. We can construct such an equilibrium with all senders playing ΓFR
on path and playing any sequentially rational strategies off path. No sender after the first
has an incentive to deviate if those upstream from them have not (as the receiver will
the learn the state from upstream senders). The first sender cannot strictly gain from
deviating, as a strict gain would imply a strict loss for a downstream sender; sequential
rationality rules this out as the downstream sender can fully reveal the state to avoid a
loss. As for the simultaneous game, the interesting question is when all equilibria (here
SPNE) are fully revealing. The following results and discussion clarify the relationship
between the our simultaneous model and a sequential version.
Proposition B.5.1. If for u1, ..., uM there is full revelation in every SPNE of the sequen-
tial game with the senders moving in some order, then there is full revelation in every
equilibrium of the simultaneous game.
Proof. We prove the following statement, from which the result follows: if there exists a
non-fully revealing equilibrium in the simultaneous game, then, for any order of senders,
there exists a non-fully revealing SPNE in the sequential game.
Choose any ordering of senders 1, ...,M . Consider any non-fully revealing equilibrium
of the simultaneous game, (Γ1, ...,ΓM) and let Γ be the experiment induced by observing
the realizations of Γ1, ...,ΓM . In the sequential game, consider the following strategy
profile: (1) sender 1 plays Γ. (2) each sender i = 2, ...,M plays ΓU if all previous senders
haven’t deviated and play some seqentially rational strategies otherwise. We will show
this is an SPNE. By Lemma 1 all senders get utility 0 from following perscribed play as Γ
is the information revealed in an equilibrium of the simultaneous game and no additional
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information is revealed. First note sender 1 has no strict incentive to deviate as any
profitable deviation would give some downstream sender strictly negative utility. This is
not possible along any path of play in an SPNE as this downstream sender can always
fully reveal the state.
If sender 1 plays Γ, senders 2, ...,M have no incentive to deviate for the following
reason. Consider any deviation Γ′j 6= ΓU for sender j, 2 ≤ j ≤M . This deviation leads to a
path of play producing information from Γ as well as additional conditionally independent
experiments. Suppose, for contradiction, this deviation yields j strictly positive expected
utility. But then j has a profitable deviation from the simulatenous game equilibrium
(Γ1, ...,ΓM); if j unilaterally plays these additional conditionally independent experiments
in addition to Γj, she gets strictly positive utility.
Proposition B.5.1 implies that the set of (zero-sum) utility functions under which
there is full revelation in all equilibria in the simultaneous game contains the set under
which for some order of senders there is full revelation in all SPNE of the sequential game.
The converse is not true. It is possible for there to be full revelation in every equilibrium
of the simultaneous game but, for every order of senders, non-fully revealing SPNE in
sequential game. The following example demonstrates this.
Example 2. There are two senders 1, 2 and three possible states 1, 2, 3. Assume that
pi1 < pi2 < pi3 (this is not necessary, but eases exposition; the assumption rules out
any two states having equal prior probabilities but is otherwise without loss). Suppose
u1((1/2, 1/2, 0)) = u1((1/2, 0, 1/2)) = 1 and u2((1/2, 1/2, 0)) = u2((1/2, 0, 1/2)) = −1.
Also, u2((0, 1/2, 1/2)) = 1 and u1((0, 1/2, 1/2)) = −1. At all other γ ∈ ∆(Ω), u1(γ) =
u2(γ) = 0. Sender 1 has an advantage at single points along edges ∆({1, 2}) and ∆({1, 3})
and sender 2 has a single advantage on edge ∆({2, 3}); on the rest of the simplex, neither
sender has an advantage. Figure B.4 summarizes this. By Theorem 1, the state is fully
revealed in all equilibria of the simultaneous game. However we will show that regardless
of the order senders move in, there is always a non-fully revealing SPNE.
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Figure B.4
First suppose sender 1 plays first, then sender 2. Consider the sender 1 playing Γ1
s.t. Pr(Γ1 = δ3) = pi3 and Pr(Γ1 = (
pi1
pi1+pi2
, pi2
pi1+pi2
, 0)) = 1− pi3 (this distribution satisfies
Bayes-plausibility). Suppose sender 2 plays Γ2 = Γ
U whenever sender 1 plays this and
following a deviation plays any sequentially rational Γ2. Note the posterior when following
perscribed play will either be δ3 or (
pi1
pi1+pi2
, pi2
pi1+pi2
, 0). The latter is not equal to (1/2, 1/2, 0)
by our assumption on the prior, and hence both senders get utility 0 at all posteriors.
Sender 1 hence has no incentive to deviate as no experiment can yield strictly positive
utility (sender 2 can always fully reveal the state and is playing sequentially rationally).
Sender 2 has no incentive to deviate as conditional on ω = 3 the receiver learns the state
and conditional on ω ∈ {1, 2} the posterior will lie on ∆({1, 2}), on which sender 2 has
no points of advantage, w.p. 1 (by Claim A.2). This is a non-fully revealing equilibrium.
If sender 2 plays first, we can construct an analogous non-fully revealing equilibrium
with Γ2 s.t. Pr(Γ2 = δ1) = pi1 and Pr(Γ2 = (0,
pi2
pi2+pi3
, pi3
pi2+pi3
)) = 1 − pi1. Sender 1 plays
Γ1 = Γ
U on path and any sequentially rational Γ1 otherwise.
In the simultaneous version of Example 2, the state is fully revealed in every equilib-
rium for the following reasons. States 2 and 3 must not be pooled in equilibrium because
if not sender 2, who has an advantage along ∆({2, 3}), could find an experiment yielding a
strictly positive payoff (violating Lemma 1). More precisely, Γ1 cannot pool states {2, 3},
because if not sender 2 can gain a strictly positive payoff. Similarly, Γ2 cannot pool {1, 2}
or {1, 3} or sender 1 take advantage. Each sender is ‘responsible’ for not pooling some
states in equilibrium because their opponent has an advantage.
More generally, when the state must be fully revealed in every equilibrium of a
simultaneous game, for every subset of states Ω′ there is some sender j who could take
advantage of Γ−j pooling Ω′. This is shown by Claim A.7 (in the proof of Prosition 2);
sender j must have an advantage somewhere on ∆(Ω). When sender j moves last in the
sequential game, then by the same argument, all upstream senders must (collectively)
not pool Ω′ in any SPNE. For example, when sender 2 moved second in the example,
sender 1 did not pool {2, 3}. However, as the last moving sender may only be able to take
advantage of some subsets of states being pooled, we need not get full revelation. If there
is a sender j who can take advantage of Ω′ being pooled for any Ω′ ∈ 2Ω s.t. |Ω′| > 1,
then when this sender moves last, every SPNE fully reveals the state. As in Example 2,
it is when there is no such sender exists that there are non-fully revealing equilibria for
all orders of senders.
52
This logic implies the following result: if any set of states is not pooled in every
equilibrium of the simultaneous game, there is an ordering of senders such that those
states are not pooled in every SPNE of the sequential game.
Proposition B.5.2. If for utility functions u1, ..., uM a set of states Ω
′ ⊆ Ω is not pooled
in every equilibrium of the simultaneous game, then, for some ordering of senders, Ω′ is
not pooled in every SPNE of the sequential game.
Proof. Suppose Ω′ ⊆ Ω′ is not pooled in every equilibrium of the simultaneous game.
Then by Proposition 2, ui(γ) > 0 for some sender i and some γ ∈ ∆(Ω′). By Claim A.7,
there exists a sender j such that for every Γ−j that pools Ω′, there exists a Γj such that
Uj(Γj,Γ−j) > 0. Consider any ordering of senders with j moving last. Then as all senders
must get utility 0, in any SPNE senders upstream from j (collectively) do not pool Ω′ (or
else j’s best response yields strictly positive utility). Hence, by Lemma A.3, all SPNE do
not pool Ω′.
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